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[S]ome nursing home residents who need dentures will
likely not be able to get them [due to recent Medicaid
cuts]; but in those cases, nursing homes should grind,
puree or blend residents’ food so they can eat, the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare informed nursing
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home managers this month. The [insurance] cuts, [which
went into effect April 1] were mandated by the Idaho
Legislature as a budget-balancing measure and, among
other reductions, limit dental care for Medicaid recipients
over age 21 to emergencies only, unless they
are
1
pregnant.—Idaho Mountain Express, April 17, 2002.
Jane Bryant Quinn’s June 3 column, “Shame Of The Rich:
Making Themselves Poor,” puts a needed spotlight on the
unfortunate fact that impoverishing oneself is a
prerequisite for Medicaid assistance.
Ms. Quinn’s accurate depiction of the extent to which
some wealthy Americans will go when it comes to hiding
and sheltering assets in order to get “free” Medicaid
coverage demonstrates how the system itself is in disarray.
While some elderly with substantial financial nest eggs
attempt to beat the system in an effort to qualify for
Medicaid, those truly in need see daily their access to
quality care threatened.
The fact of the matter is that in state after state, Medicaid
is severely under funded in a manner that undermines the
original intent of the program - which is to provide
medical assistance to low-income Americans. Those most
in need are being shortchanged by those who, long ago,
should and could have been planning and saving for the
possibility of long term care needs, had they been
apprised of the consequences of not doing so and
encouraged with appropriate government incentives.—
American Health Care Association opinion editorial on2
Jane Bryant Quinn’s June 3, 2001, Washington Post article.
I. INTRODUCTION
For lawyers, ethics and morality are not equivalents. Although
ethics is frequently the study of morals and, as such, is the study of
3
what ought to happen, for the lawyer its primary meaning is
1. In Idaho, Medicaid Cuts Means No Dental Care, THE ELDER LAW EBULLETIN
(April 23, 2002), at http://www.tn-elderlaw.com/telb/020423.html#n3.
2. The Briefing Room: Opinion Editorial regarding Washington Post June 3, 2001
Jane Bryant Quinn Article, American Health Care Association, at
http://www.ahca.org/brief/010603.htm (last visited July 20, 2002).
3. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE M ETAPHYSIC OF
M ORALS 10 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., Prometheus Books 1987) (1785). In
a purely relative ethical system, it may be difficult to identify what ought to
happen. In fact, when one is told that he ought to do this or that, the response is
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adherence to established canons of ethics. In practice, this means
adherence to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted
in the state of the lawyer’s practice and to any other local rules that
4
apply to lawyers.
Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct [MRPC]
distinguishes the lawyer’s role as adviser from his role as advocate,
and it is the adviser’s “hat” that elder law attorneys wear when
engaging in Medicaid planning. As advisers, lawyers may consider
not only technical legal rules but also “moral, economic, social and
5
political factors” relevant to the client’s situation. Although the
client, not the lawyer, ultimately decides what to do with the advice
6
given, it is not inappropriate for the lawyer to refer to relevant
7
moral and ethical considerations. Because the lawyer’s ethical
analysis is, in part, derivative, the practical challenge for us as elder
law attorneys is whether we ought to provide Medicaid planning
8
advice. If we advise clients concerning Medicaid planning, then
our task is to provide competent advice within the bounds of law
9
and applicable ethical canons.
often, “You have been dreaming.” See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 186 (2d
ed. 1994).
4. A few states, such as Tennessee, still follow the older American Bar
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility. For our purposes,
however, the differences, if any, are unimportant, so we will focus on the newer
Model Rules, first issued in 1983. BNA INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ M ANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:3 (2002).
5. M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002) [hereinafter MRPC]. See
also id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (stating that advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of
little value to a client).
6. Id. R. 1.2(a) (stating a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions
concerning the objectives of representation); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS:
THE LAWYER’ S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2002-2003, at §§ 3-3.2,
19-1 (2002). Interestingly, in a substituted judgment case, one court noted “it
cannot be reasonably contended that a competent, reasonable individual . . .
would not engage in the estate and Medicaid planning proposed in the petition.”
In re John XX, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 (App. Div. 1996).
7. MRPC, R. 2.1, cmt. 2.
8. Model Rule 1.2(b) underscores the derivative nature of the lawyeradviser’s task. Id. R. 1.2(b). Representation does not constitute an endorsement of
the client’s viewpoint. Nonetheless, the lawyer cannot provide the guidance
suggested in Rule 2.1 without having examined moral, economic, social and
political factors. Thus, the study of ethics in this context should yield practical,
rather than theoretical, results. Cf. BERNARD M AYO, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT AND
WRONG 1 (1986) (“Is ethics, or moral philosophy, a practical or a theoretical
subject?”).
9. See MRPC, R. 1.1; GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.1
(2000), http://www.gabar.org/grpc11.htm; Proposed TENNESSEE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2001),
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II. THE ELDER LAW ATTORNEY’ S ETHICAL DILEMMA
Clients request Medicaid planning advice primarily to lessen
10
the economic impact of long-term care. As detailed in this article,
the cost of long-term care is often catastrophic for elderly, middleclass individuals and couples. Is it “wrong” to help the elderly
11
protect their assets by engaging in Medicaid planning? The short
answer is “no.” Health care costs threaten to deplete an elder’s
estate, during his lifetime and after death. The goal of Medicaid
planning is therefore to minimize the financial impact of the cost
of health care and long-term care. Ethical rules allow elder law
attorneys to assist clients who wish to minimize those costs, even if
the plan is aggressive, as long as the representation is carried out
12
within the bounds of the law.
We frame the issues by pointing out why the elderly seek out
advice:
[O]lder Americans must devote 80% of their income to
food, shelter, health care and transportation . . . .Being
old in America means taking the leftovers from a health
care system that caters to the young. The 10% of our
people over 65 account for 28% of the nation’s total
medical bill. Yet Medicare--for all the good it has done-pays less than 40% of the medical bills of its recipients,
and the proportion has been declining. The strength of
the medical lobby has prevented needed changes in the
health care delivery system, perpetuating needless
http://www.tba.org/committees/Conduct/Exhibit-A/newfinalred-a.pdf); MRPC,
R. 1.16(a)(1); Durie v. State, 751 So.2d 685, 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(reiterating that lawyers cannot engage in dishonest or unethical conduct). In this
case, a lawyer was held accountable when he “stepped over the ethical and
criminal line” by misrepresenting Medicaid’s portion of a settlement. Id.
10. “If your parent wants to protect his assets before going on Medicaid, get
him to meet with a lawyer who specializes in Medicaid planning because the rules
are complicated.” VIRGINIA M ORRIS, HOW TO CARE FOR AGING PARENTS 260 (1996).
For an analysis of the economic impact of long term care, see LISA ALECXIH &
DAVID KENNELL, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LONG-TERM CARE ON INDIVIDUALS (1994),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/ecoimpes.htm.
11. While one “can debate whether Medicaid planning is sound public social
or fiscal policy,” it is nonetheless legal. In re Baird, 634 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 (Sup. Ct.
1995); In re Daniels, 618 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1994). We recognize that
lawyers who undertake representation for a client must abide by the client’s
objectives. See, e.g., MPRC, R. 1.2(a). The inquiry here is whether the attorney
should accept employment.
12. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at § 22-1.2 (discussing advice in the tax planning
context, quoting A.B.A. Formal Opinion 85-352). Medicaid planning is not hiding
assets. Medicaid planners use the rules of Medicaid to the advantage of the client.
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inefficiencies that drive the costs of Medicare skyward. . . .
[W]e [must] alleviate13 the heavy medical bill burden now
borne by the elderly.
Since Morris Udall spoke those words 27 years ago, little has
14
changed--except that America is getting older. Meanwhile, health
15
care costs continue to increase as a percentage of income, and
16
long-term care is often needed at a time when income has fallen.
The elderly seek competent legal advice about how to respond
when crisis looms, and when it strikes. In discharging his duty
under MRPC 2.1, though, what factors should the elder law
attorney focus on? This article will explore the “moral, economic,
17
social and political factors” implicated by Medicaid planning.
We examine differing stakeholder positions, current long-term
care financing issues, and reform options, albeit with Medicaid
18
planning as the focal point. The current system, or Medicaid
planning, for that matter, is not necessarily the best long-term
19
solution for the elderly. In the end, we believe the law should be
structured to provide adequate health care, including long-term
20
care, for all persons, regardless of economic status or age. Elders
13. Morris K. Udall, Public Policy and the Future of Aging, Address given
before the National Council on Aging (Sept. 30, 1975), http://www.
library.arizona.edu/branches/spc/udall/aging_htm.html.
14. THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH
POLICY: A CLINICAL APPROACH 3 (2d ed. 1998).
15. AARP, BEYOND 50.02: A REPORT TO THE NATION ON TRENDS IN HEALTH
SECURITY 5 (2002) (reporting that persons aged fifty and older spent an average of
$3,881 per year for non-nursing home medical expenses in 1996, up 310% from
1977), http://www.aarp.org/beyond50/graphics/pdfs/beyond50_02one.pdf.
16. Income for households aged 65 and older averaged $21,827, compared
with income for households under sixty-five averaging $84,591. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, REPORT HINC-01, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS, BY TOTAL
M ONEY INCOME IN 2000 (2001), http://ferret.bls.census.gov/macro/032001/
hhinc/new01_001.htm.
17. To wit: a moral, economic, social and political base. As for ethics, it is the
study of morals or moral issues. In a profession, ethics is an understanding, either
formal or informal, of acceptable conduct. WILLIAM S. SAHAKIAN, ETHICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES AND PROBLEMS 6 (1974). Ethics rules without practical
application are defective. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 2 (2d ed. 1993).
18. Since it would be impossible to adopt individual views of “right” and
“good,” the “good” referred to in this article is Aristotle’s notion of the supreme
good. See ARISTOTLE, XIX NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 5 (H. Rackham trans., 1968).
Medicaid is a creature of politics and, therefore, its end should be the good of
Man. Id. at 7.
19. M AYO, supra note 8, at 67 (“Laws are subject to criticism in a way in which
morality is not.”).
20. “Age should never be recognized as the determinative factor in the
balancing test for health care services.” George P. Smith II, Allocating Health Care
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should be guaranteed access to good health care. Until universal
access becomes a reality, we conclude that Medicaid planning is
justified within a health care system that elevates profit over patient
care.
III. HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
The public health infrastructure consists of those resources
necessary to deliver essential public health services to every
21
community. Its goals are (or should be) to provide good care to
more or less the entire population without bankrupting the
22
treasury in the process. The value society places on health is
pivotal when determining what resources will or must be devoted to
23
delivering health care services. Also pivotal, in the context of this
24
article, is the value of an elderly person’s life. Assuming resources
Resources to the Elderly, 1 ELDER L. REV. 21, 24 (2002), http://www.uws.edu.au/
law/elderlaw/smith.pdf. America’s market system efficiently meets the needs of
the young and strong. Its record is less impressive where elders are concerned,
possibly due to the waning of productivity in later years. Id. at 21. “The way we
treat our older citizens in this country is like certain ancient tribal societies, where
a person who is too old for hunting and warfare was placed ceremonially on a raft
and allowed to float down a river.” Udall, supra note 13. This view emerged, in
large part, during the Industrial Revolution. As jobs moved from farms to
factories, “[o]lder citizens either could not compete or were seen as taking jobs
from younger breadwinners. The result is that they came to be considered a
burden on families and society in general.” JIMMY CARTER, THE VIRTUES OF AGING
12 (1998).
21. 2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010,
at 23-3 (2d ed. 2000), http://www.health.gov/healthypeople/document/
pdf/volume2/23PHI.pdf. The public health infrastructure includes governmental
and non-governmental entities that provide health care services. Id. A stated goal
of HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010 is the elimination of health disparities. Id. at 23-6.
22. David Wilsford, Commentary: Ideas, Institutions, and Resources, 25 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’ Y & L. 975, 975 (2000).
23. See H.R. Con. Res. 99, 107th Cong. (2001) (urging Congress to enact
legislation by October 2004 that guarantees health care access to every person in
the United States regardless of income, age, employment or health status); Roger
N. Levy, Ethical Issues: The Rationing of Care to the Geriatric Patient, 2 ARCHIVES OF THE
AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 113, 114-115 (1998) (reviewing differing
legal and philosophic positions relating to health care as a right),
http://www.hospitalmanagement.net/informer/management/pc_social/index.ht
ml; Leonard Peikoff, Health Care is Not a Right, Speech delivered at a Town Hall
Meeting on the Clinton Health Plan (Dec. 11, 1993) (arguing that socialized
medicine is immoral), http://www.bdt.com/pages/Peikoff.html; see also WILLIAM
D. NORDHAUS, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF IMPROVED HEALTH
TO LIVING STANDARDS (2002) (arguing that health is a measure of national
prosperity), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8818.
24. Smith, supra note 20, at 22.
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25

are available, should they be deployed to improve health and to
save, or prolong lives? If society places a premium on health (and
life) and dedicates resources to the delivery of health care services,
access will expand and, presumably, the quality of life will improve.
Although many nations, and the World Health Organization,
26
regard health care as a fundamental human right, the United
27
States does not. Instead, in the United States health care is a
28
commodity. Health care services are bought and sold on the “free
market.” The market is competitive, largely amoral, and (in
theory) governed by the free market’s “invisible hand,” within a
framework of public laws and regulations by non-governmental
organizations (for example, accrediting organizations such as the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations,
29
which accredits the majority of the country’s medical facilities). If
25. See discussion of rationing, infra this section.
26. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT, at
http://www.who.int/archives/who50/en/human.htm (last visited July 20, 2002).
For a Judeo-Christian perspective on health care as a right, see Herbert W. Titus,
The Right to Medical Care Within a Biblical Worldview: The Declaration of
Independence and the United States Constitution, Speech before the Conference
on Health Care in Crisis: A Biblical Response (May 2, 1992), http://bmei.org/
jbem/volume10/num2/titus.htm.
27. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 586 N.Y.S.2d 861, 865 (App. Div. 1992) (stating
that since there is no system of public health insurance, all individuals who possess
the means are required to pay for their own care); see also Editorial, Where Health
Care is Not a Right, 359 THE LANCET 1871 (2002) (“Americans and their families are
living shorter and sicker lives because they live in a country where access to health
care remains a privilege and not a right.”), http://www.thelancet.com.
28. Wilsford, supra note 22, at 975; M ARCIA ANGELL ET AL., PHYSICIANS’
WORKING PAPER ON SINGLE-PAYER NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (2001),
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/whitepaper.pdf; Leslie
P. Francis, Legal Rights to Health Care at the End of Life, 282 M ED . STDNT. J. AM. MED .
ASS’ N 2079 (1999), http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/msjama/articles/vol_282/
no_21/jms90042.htm; see also BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at viii, 2146. “Access” means “the timely use of personal health services to achieve the best
possible health outcomes.” 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010, at 1-40 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter HEALTHY PEOPLE I],
http://health.gov/healthypeople/document/HTML/Volume1/01Access.htm#_T
oc489432806. “Access to quality care is important to eliminate health disparities
and increase the quality and years of healthy life for all persons in the United
States.” Id. at 1-3.
29. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 194 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1992) (1776); Donald W. Light,
Sociological Perspectives on Competition in Health Care, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’ Y & L.
969-970 (2000); see also ID Sec. Systems Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint Systems, Inc.,
198 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (explaining the notion that a business
person will make decisions that tend to maximize profit is so basic to our
economic system that it hardly requires citation). Markets can be disrupted by
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health care services were viewed as a right instead of as a
commodity, health care would be an entitlement that the right
30
holder could demand regardless of cost.
America’s free market health care system is a political
31
construct regarding how health care will be delivered. This
construct rests on the assumption that competition, driven by each
provider’s desire to maximize personal gain, will unleash energy
32
and imagination and, thereby, increase societal wealth.
Nonetheless, the reality is that persons with financial means have
greater access to health care, while those without financial means
regulation. Conversion from a fee-for-service to an insurance model introduced
moral hazard into the equation, arguably, giving the invisible hand a case of
arthritis. See generally BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 7-20 (discussing
evolution of the health care payment system from out-of-pocket payments to
individual insurance, then to employer provided insurance and finally, the
introduction of social insurance). For an interesting analysis, see M ARTIN GAYNOR,
ARE INVISIBLE HANDS GOOD HANDS?: MORAL HAZARD, COMPETITION, AND THE 2ND
BEST IN HEALTH CARE M ARKETS (1998) (arguing that insurance leads to excess
consumption; however, competition, or even monopoly, in insurance markets
reduces the market price for health care, which benefits consumers; the benefit to
consumers outweighs the loss of profits suffered by the medical industry),
http://equilibrium.heinz.cmu.edu/mgaynor/papers/2ndbestfind2.pdf.
30. Levy, supra note 23, at 114. Because health care resources are limited,
most moralists therefore argue for health care as a limited right. Id. at 115. Of
course, universal access would increase moral hazard (discussed later), which may
introduce new problems, such as queuing for services. See, e.g., PETER LANDRY,
BLUPETE’ S COMMENTARY: A RIGHT TO M EDICAL CARE (1999) (complaining about the
wait for health care services in Canada and noting that wealthy Canadians get
immediate care in the U.S.), at http://www.blupete.com/Commentary/
MedCareMay’99.htm. Recent research reported in the journal Health Affairs,
however, found that surprisingly few Canadians travel to the United States for
health care, despite the persistence of the myth, suggesting that anecdotes of long
lines endured by Canadians in their own country may be nothing more than
fodder for critics of universal health care. Steven J. Katz et al., Phantoms in the
Snow: Canadians Use of Health Care Services in the United States, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS,
May-June 2002, at 19.
31. See Deborah Stone, United States, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’ Y & L. 953, 953
(2000). The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services proposes that 100% of
the U.S. population have access to health care by 2010; its proposal follows the
free market model through the use of insurance. See HEALTHY PEOPLE I, supra note
28, at 1-13, 1-14.
32. See Light, supra note 29, at 969-71. Light notes that competition rewards
innovation, those who create needs. There is nothing inherent about the free
market system that rewards efficiency in meeting established needs. “The
traditional debate pitted arguments of monopoly and monopsony on the one side,
and innovation on the other, . . . it was feared that government production would
be technologically inefficient and innovation would be stifled.” DAVID M. CUTLER,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, HEALTH CARE AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR
30 (2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8802.
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33

enjoy only limited access. The effect on the overall good health of
34
persons with limited means is predictable.
Long-term care is the predominate issue in Medicaid
planning, which makes those services most relevant to this
examination. Long-term care services include:
[a] broad range of health and social services delivered in
institutions, in the community and at home. Long-term
care services include institutional services, such as those
delivered in nursing homes, rehabilitation hospitals,
subacute care facilities, hospice facilities, and assisted
living facilities; services delivered in the home, such as
home health and personal care, hospice, homemaker, and
meals; and community-based services, such as adult day
care, social services, congregate meals, transportation and
escort services, legal protective services,
and counseling
35
for client as well as their caregivers.
People with physical or mental conditions that limit their
36
capacity for self-care need these services to improve functioning,
maintain existing living functions, or to slow deterioration in
functioning while care is delivered in the least restrictive
37
environment. Yet long-term care is expensive, thereby limiting
38
access.
33. Whether access to health care should be defined in terms of wealth is a
fundamental question for America. Although we value private property rights,
and where they exist, there will always be inequalities of fortune, see Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915), one can legitimately question whether health care,
which is often linked to life itself, should be held hostage in this manner. “Should,
for example, a millionaire be allowed greater access to life-saving treatment than a
pauper, even if we gladly allow greater access to exotic vacation spots?” Sanford
Levinson, The Welfare State, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 553, 555 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). We think not.
34. See Stone, supra note 31, at 954. Stone’s article is part of a series reviewing
health care systems around the globe. In 1999, U.S. Census Bureau statistics
showed that 44 million Americans were uninsured. Id. There is a clear relationship
between health and wealth. “Poorer people die younger and are sicker than
richer people . . . .” Angus Deaton, Policy Implications of the Gradient of Health and
Wealth, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 13. For an interesting viewpoint on
the virtues of a health care free market, see SHELDON L. RICHMAN, A FREE M ARKET
FOR HEALTH CARE, at http://www.amatecon.com/etext/dosm/dosm-ch03.html
(last visited July 20, 2002).
35. HEALTHY PEOPLE I, supra note 28, at 1-41.
36. Ability to care for oneself is sometimes measured by reference to one’s
ability to perform activities of daily living, 42 C.F.R. § 483.25(a)(1) (2001), or
instrumental activities of daily living.
37. HEALTHY PEOPLE I, supra note 28, at 1-6.
38. Health care costs for America’s elderly rose three times faster than the
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IV. THE DEVASTATING FINANCIAL IMPACT OF LONG-TERM CARE
Long-term care can be ruinously expensive for individuals and
39
families. When families need long-term care, paying for it can
40
quickly put them between a rock and a hard place. The national
41
average monthly cost for nursing home care is $4,654. By
contrast, the median income in FY 2000 for the 11.6 million
households headed by persons aged sixty-five or older was $32,854
42
(or $2,737.83 per month). Many elderly Americans simply cannot

CPI from 1977 through 1987; by 1996, excluding nursing home costs, “[m]edicare
beneficiaries spent an average of $2600 out-of-pocket on health care costs above
what Medicare and private insurers paid. This represented 21% of household
income for elderly individuals, up from 15% in 1987.” Mark P. Doescher et al.,
Supplemental Insurance and Mortality in Elderly Americans, 9 ARCHIVES OF FAMILY
M EDICINE (2000), http://archfami.ama-assn.org/issues/v9n3/ffull/foc9054.html.
Although the data source is not disclosed, the Americans for Long-Term Care
Security Website includes a “Future Costs Calculator” that estimates the cost of
long-term care based on gender, age and state, at http://www.ltcweb.org. For
example, the estimated cost of long-term care for a male, aged 40, living in
Tennessee is $144,709.80.
39. See, e.g., In re Shah, 694 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (App. Div. 1999) (stating costs are
“astronomical”), aff’d 711 N.Y.S.2d 824, 832 (2000) (describing medical treatment
as “ruinously expensive”); In re Tyler, 2002 WL 1274125, at *10 (D.C. Super. May
30, 2002) (citing Shah in recognizing ruinously expensive cost of long-term care,
but denying a community spouse’s petition - without prejudice to refile with
additional evidence - where she sought to transfer her incompetent husband’s
assets to herself in a support context).
40. DANA SHILLING, FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE OLDER CLIENT 109 (5th ed.
2001).
41. AARP, THE COSTS OF LONG-TERM CARE: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS VERSUS
REALITY 24 (2001), http://research.aarp.org/health/ltc_costs.pdf. A CNA study
conducted in 2001, surveying 11,126 nursing homes throughout the United States
concluded that daily charges ranged from $115 to $146 depending on the level of
care required. CNA, STUDY FINDS NURSING HOME COSTS STEADILY INCREASING, at
http://www.cna.com/cna/solutions/html/headline_072501.html (July 25, 2001).
News stories circulating in March 2002 reported the findings of a survey
commissioned by GE Long-term Care Insurance of San Rafael. Those findings
suggest that the cost of long-term care in certain areas may be substantially higher.
Nursing home care in the ten most expensive regions of the country can range
from $79,900 annually in the Philadelphia metro areas to $163,400 in Alaska. See
Nursing Home Care Costs top $80,000 a year survey says, E. BAY BUS. TIMES, March 4,
2002, http://eastbay.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2002/03/04/daily2.html.
42. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION ON
AGING,
A
PROFILE
OF
OLDER
AMERICANS: 2001, at
9 (2001),
http://www.aoa.dhhs.gov/aoa/stats/profile/2001/2001profile.pdf.
Over two
million persons celebrated their 65th birthday in 2000. Id. at 1. Each of those
persons has a life expectancy of an additional 17.9 years. Id. Seventy-six percent
of older homeowners own homes (a principal subject of Medicaid planning) that
are paid for, with an average value of $96,442 in 1999. Id. at 10.
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43

afford long-term care. This quandary, need coupled with limited or
44
no access, defines the initial role of the elder law attorney.
Given the expense of long-term care, many seniors who need
that care are soon impoverished. There is only one government
program to which families can turn for help financing long-term
45
care: Medicaid. “Medicaid is the major source of financing for
long-term care for the elderly and for non-elderly persons with
46
disabilities.” No longer just the safety net for the poor, it is now
47
the safety net for America’s middle class seniors.
The crisis that long-term care financing imposes is uniquely a
43. “Most elderly people live on limited incomes and few can afford the high
cost of long-term care. Medicaid is the safety net because no other practical
options exist to meet these seniors long-term care needs.” Medicaid’s Role for
Seniors: Challenges in a Fiscally Constrained Environment: Testimony given for “The
Economic Downturn and Its Impact on Seniors”, Special Committee on Aging, United States
Senate 2 (2002) (statement of Barbara Lyons, Deputy Director of The Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured), at http://www.kff.org. Of note,
Medicare and Medicaid were created as a response to a shift in insurance pricing
practices. Insurance companies shifted from community rating, which was more
favorable to high risk insureds, to experience ratings. As a result, policy premiums
rose for the elderly and disabled, putting the cost of insurance beyond reach.
BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 14, 157.
44. A 1995 survey found that many elder persons go without care due to its
expense, lack of available services, and lack of eligibility for government benefits
that would provide care. Judith Feder et al., Long-Term Care in the United States: An
Overview, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS, May-June 2000, at 40, 47. We note that elder self
neglect is a serious problem which can be triggered by confusion. See THE
NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE AT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES
ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL ELDER ABUSE INCIDENCE STUDY: FINAL REPORT
SEPTEMBER 1998, at 4-33 (1998), http://www.aoa.gov/abuse/report/main-pdf.htm.
By clearing up confusion regarding the availability of health care resources, elder
law attorneys may help prevent self-neglect. See id.
45. Medicare funding for long-term care is subject to limiting criteria. When
it is available, it is limited to 100 days of coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2)(A)
(1994); JUDITH A. STEIN & ALFRED J. CHIPLIN, 2002 MEDICARE HANDBOOK § 3.02
(2002).
46. KAISER COMMISSION ON M EDICAID FACTS, MEDICAID’ S ROLE IN LONG-TERM
CARE (2001), http://www.kff.org/content/2001/2186/2186.pdf.
47.
[C]ontrary to the perceptions of some, Medicaid is not just a lifeline
for America’s poorest citizens. Rather, for America’s seniors, Medicaid
is now also very much a middle class program. Funded jointly by the
states and the federal government, Medicaid today pays nearly twothirds of all nursing home and long-term care bills. So when Medicaid
is in trouble, so too is middle America.
The Economic Downturn & Its Effects on Seniors, Testimony to the Senate Special Committee
on Aging (2002) (opening statement of U. S. Senator Larry Craig, Ranking
Member
of
the
U.S.
Senate
Special
Committee
on
Aging),
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr79lc.htm.
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48

middle-class problem. This is true because Medicaid pays only for
persons who meet the program’s strict limitations on assets and
income. Those who elect not to rely on Medicaid either have
sufficient assets to pay for their long-term care or have purchased
long-term care insurance to shift the cost to an insurance company.
Most middle-class persons who are facing a lengthy nursing home
stay do not have these options, however. They face the prospect of
depleting their lifetime savings to pay for nursing home care.
Once they deplete their assets, known as “spend-down,” they are
49
“poor enough” to qualify for Medicaid. Middle-class people don’t
want to pay the nursing home, and they don’t want to be poor
either. So what do they do? To avoid this harsh result, they engage
in Medicaid planning, to protect their assets for the benefit of
themselves, their spouses, and their heirs. Because Medicaid is
means-tested, Medicaid planning is the process of helping clients
“rearrange” their assets so as to qualify for Medicaid nursing home
benefits. This is done by helping the client meet Medicaid’s
50
seemingly inscrutable eligibility rules by putting assets out of the
reach of the Medicaid program (and, often, out of the legal reach
of the client himself). Effective Medicaid planning shifts the cost
of long-term care from the Medicaid applicant to the government
(in other words, to the taxpayers).
48. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ELDER LAW ATTORNEYS, WHITE PAPER ON REFORMING
DELIVERY, ACCESSIBILITY AND FINANCING OF LONG-TERM CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2000) [hereinafter NAELA WHITE PAPER], http://www.naela.org.
49. ALECXIH & KENNELL, supra note 10.
At an average national cost of $51,000 per year for long-term care
services and supports an individual or family cannot maintain
economic security even if they are prepared for retirement.
Unfortunately, most Americans are unaware of how long-term care is
paid for in this country. They do not realize until it’s too late that we
use Medicaid, a welfare program that requires them to spend down
their assets in order to receive assistance with staggering costs.
Senator David Durenberger, Chairman, Citizens for Long-term Care, Statement
(Apr. 7, 1999), http://www.citizensforltc.org/speeches.htm.
50. The federal and state Medicaid statutes have been described as the
regulatory equivalent of the “Serbonian bog.” See John Milton, Paradise Lost, in
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD; 32 JOHN M ILTON, Bk. 2, at 124 (Robert
Maynard Hutchins ed., William Benton 1952) (1667) (“A gulf profound, as that
Serbonian bog Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old, Where armies whole have
been sunk.”). These laws and regulations have also been characterized as “almost
unintelligible to the uninitiated,” Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977), as an “aggravated assault on the
English language, resistant to attempts to understand it,” Friedman v. Berger, 409
F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and as “labyrinthian,” Roloff v. Sullivan, 975
F.2d 333, 340 n.12 (7th Cir. 1992).
THE
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V. MEDICAID TODAY: A STRAINED SYSTEM
51

Title XIX of the Social Security Act on Medical Assistance,
commonly called Medicaid, is a cooperative federal-state program
funded in large part by the federal government and administered
52
by the states. While state participation is voluntary, participating
states must adopt plans that comply with certain requirements im53
posed by federal statutes and regulations. The program itself is
“basically administered by each state within certain broad
54
requirements and guidelines.” As a result, the Medicaid program
varies considerably from state to state, as well as within each state
55
over time.
The federal government’s stated goal is 100% access to health
56
care. Access to long-term care is ensured through Medicaid,
57
which is sometimes referred to as the “safety net.” Medicaid is the
largest public source of funding for long-term care in the United
58
States.
Who pays for long-term care? The United States Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the largest purchaser of
59
health care in the world.
“Medicare and Medicaid outlays,
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396v (1994).
52. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n.1 (1985).
53. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990).
54. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 15 (3d Cir. 1989).
55. Medicaid is discussed exhaustively in every major elder law treatise. For
more information, the federal government’s explanation of Medicaid is available
at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/medicaid.htm.
56. See HEALTHY PEOPLE I, supra note 28, § 1-3; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH
AND
HUMAN
SERVICES,
CLOSING
THE
HEALTH
GAP,
at
http://www.healthgap.omhrc.gov (last visited July 20, 2002).
57. “These people are the most needy in the country and it is appropriate for
medical care costs to be met, first, for these people.” Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S.
569, 590 (1982) (viewing a congressional decision to distribute public assistance
benefits on the basis of income and resources as “rational”).
58. Medicaid is the largest source of funding for medical and health-related
services for America’s poorest people. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION,
M EDICAID:
A
BRIEF
SUMMARY, at http://hcfa.gov/pubforms/actuary/
ormedmed/default4.htm (last visited July 20, 2002); see also Long Term Care: Aging
Baby Boom Generation Will Increase Demand and Burden on Federal and State Budgets:
Testimony to the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate 4 (2002)(statement of
David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States) (noting in 2000,
Medicaid paid for 45% of total long-term care expenditures) [hereinafter Long
Term Care], http://www.gao.gov. It is described as “one of the pillars that holds up
the American health care system.” ACADEMY FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH AND
HEALTH POLICY, STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES, STATE OF THE STATES 5 (2002)
(quoting Sara Rosenbaum); see also NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 3.
59. See CENTERS FOR M EDICARE AND M EDICAID SERVICES, HCFA FINANCIAL
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including State funding, represent thirty-three cents of every dollar
spent on health care in the United States—fifty-eight cents of every
dollar spent on nursing homes, forty-eight cents of every dollar
received by U.S. Hospitals, and twenty-seven cents of every dollar
60
spent on physician services.” At present, Medicare and Medicaid
pick up fourteen percent and forty-five percent of the tab for total
61
long-term care expenditures respectively. An additional three
percent is paid through other public programs, with the remainder
62
coming from private sources. Medicaid expenditures will total
63
$245 billion in FY 2002, compared with $230 billion for Medicare.
Medicaid expenditures will increase from $228,026,089,368 in FY
64
65
2001 and $206,083,216,717 in FY 2000.
Spending on long-term care is on an upward spiral, and there
is no ceiling in sight. From 1987 to 1996, annual nursing home
expenses in the United States increased from $28 billion to $70
66
billion, and the cost per resident day increased from $56 to $118.
By 2000, annual spending on long-term care (which includes nonREPORT FISCAL YEAR 2000, at v (2001) [hereinafter HCFA FINANCIAL REPORT],
http://www.cms.hhs.gov. HCFA is now Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
or “CMS.”
60. Id. at 1; cf. JONATHAN GRUBER, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
M EDICAID 17-19, 21-22 (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7829.
61. Long Term Care, supra note 58, at 4; see also Medicaid Financial Management:
Better Oversight of State Claims for Federal Reimbursement Needed: Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 107th Cong. 3
(2002) (statement of Linda M. Calbom, Director, Financial Management and
Assurance) (reporting that between 1992 and 2000, the federal share of Medicaid
rose
seventy-four
percent,
from
$69
billion
to
$120
billion),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02706t.pdf.
62. Long-Term Care, supra note 58, at 4.
63. Id. In FY 2002, Medicaid will serve 44.7 million persons; by comparison,
Medicare will serve 40 million. Id. The CBO projects the average annual rate of
growth in Medicaid spending as 9.5% for FY 2001-2002 and as 8.5% for fiscal years
2002-2012. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2003-2012, at 69, Table 4-2 (2002) [hereinafter BUDGET
AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK], available at http://www.cbo.gov.
64. See FY 2001 NET REPORTED M EDICAID AND SCHIP EXPENDITURES (2002),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/totexp01.pdf.
65. See NET REPORTED M EDICAID AND SCHIP EXPENDITURES, FY 2002,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/totexp00.pdf. In FY 1999, the number was
$189,861,201,380. See NET REPORTED M EDICAID AND SCHIP EXPENDITURES FY 1999,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/totexp99.pdf. By way of contrast, in 1965,
combined spending on the programs that became Medicaid was $1.3 billion.
GRUBER, supra note 60, at 2-3.
66. M EDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY, NURSING HOME EXPENSES, 1987 AND
1996, at 6 (2001), http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/papers/cb6_01-0029/cb6.pdf.
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nursing home care) increased to $137 billion. By 2011, long-term
care spending is projected to be $237 billion. “By 2030,” says the
Congressional Budget Office, “the number of workers is expected
to rise by only 15% while the number of Social Security and
Medicare beneficiaries will nearly double. That growth, combined
with increases in life expectancy, will boost spending on long-term
67
care, about half of which is financed by Medicare and Medicaid.”
68
The cost just for the elderly could reach $379 billion by 2050.
Moreover, costs are expected to accelerate during the next decade
due to expanded eligibility for home- and community-based
69
services.
70
In 2000, 281.4 million persons resided in the United States.
71
Thirty-five million (12%) were age sixty-five or older. As baby
boomers (those born from 1946 through 1964) begin qualifying for
entitlements such as Medicare and Social Security at the end of this
72
decade, government budgets will be further strained.
Absent reform, spending for net interest, Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid will consume three-quarters of federal
73
revenue by 2030.
Total federal spending on health care is
projected to increase from 13.4% of GDP in 1999 to 15.9% of GDP
74
in 2010. Within state budgets, Medicaid is one of the largest
75
categories of spending, second only to education. Spending
67. BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 63, at 5; see also NATIONAL
HEALTH
CARE
EXPENDITURES
PROJECTIONS:
2001-2011
(2002),
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/projections-2001/highlights.asp.
68. Long-Term Care, supra note 58, at 2. “In 2000, Medicaid paid 45% (about
$62 billion) of total long-term care expenditures.” Id. at 4.
69. See BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 63, at 76.
70. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE : 2000, at 1 (2001), http://www.census.gov.
71. Id. Census data shows that 4.5% of people sixty-five years and older were
living in nursing homes in 2000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 65 YEARS AND OVER
POPULATION: 2000, at 7 (2001), http://www.census.gov. The U.S. is not alone; one
in ten persons world-wide is sixty years or older. Press Release, United Nations
Releases New Statistics on Population Aging 2 (Feb. 28, 2002),
http://www.un.org/ageing/note5713.doc.htm. Over 12 million people in the
United States need long-term care. KAISER COMMISSION, MEDICAID’ S ROLE IN LONGTERM CARE 1 (2001), http://www.kff.org. Most people who need long-term care
receive it at home or in the community. About 12% are in nursing homes. “Of
the 1.3 million elderly in nursing homes, half are over the age of 85.” Id.
72. Although the elderly and disabled comprise 28% of Medicaid enrollees,
they account for 67% of program spending. See HCFA FINANCIAL REPORT, supra
note 59, at 7.
73. Id.
74. Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress, 145-46
(Feb. 2002), http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2003/pdf/2002_erp.pdf.
75. VERNON K. SMITH, NATIONAL GOVERNOR’ S ASSOCIATION, MAKING M EDICAID
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growth, particularly in costs for nursing homes and community76
based programs, has triggered fiscal crises in many states.
The cost of long-term care will be ultimately born by taxpayers
regardless of whether care is provided privately or through a public
77
delivery system. To maintain care at present levels, the “graying of
America” will force the market to devote a higher percentage of
labor to the delivery of long-term care, thereby adding to the
burden of the nation’s long-term care costs. We cannot measure
that cost in dollar terms. The real cost is the lost opportunity of
placing that labor elsewhere. Twenty to thirty years from now, will
78
there be enough workers to care for America’s elderly?
VI. MEDICAID STEPS IN
Need for Medicaid is determined on a case-by-case basis, using
eligibility criteria that initially divide recipients into three groups:
(i) mandatory categorically needy; (ii) optional categorically needy;
79
and (iii) medically needy.
To become eligible for Medicaid nursing-home benefits, the
applicant demonstrates categorical eligibility by showing that he or
80
she is: (i) aged sixty-five years or older; (ii) a United States
citizen, a lawfully admitted alien, or an alien permanently residing
81
in the United States under color of law; (iii) a resident of the state
82
where the Medicaid application is filed; and (iv) confined
BETTER: OPTIONS TO ALLOW STATES TO CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE AND TO BRING THE
PROGRAM UP TO DATE IN TODAY’ S HEALTH CARE M ARKETPLACE 3 (2002), available at
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/MAKINGMEDICAIDBETTER.pdf.
76. Id. at 7.
77. “[A]ll funds for health services ultimately come from private households,
regardless of whether they flow through government, business, or charities.”
Stone, supra note 31, at 953.
78. Growth of the pool of available health care workers has not kept pace
with the pool of prospective long-term care residents. See ROBYN I. STONE, LONGTERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY WITH DISABILITIES: CURRENT POLICY, EMERGING
TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 31 (2000) (noting there
is a current shortage of doctors with training to meet the needs of the elderly; the
problem will worsen in the future; there are similar shortages in the nursing and
paraprofessional labor pools), http://www.milbank.org/0008stone/.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (1994); HFCA’S STATE M EDICAID M ANUAL, §
3601 (1997), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/pubforms/pub45/pub_45.htm; see also
JANE PERKINS & SARAH SOMERS, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, AN ADVOCATE’ S
GUIDE TO THE M EDICAID PROGRAM 3.3 (2001).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b)(1) (1994); 42 C.F.R § 435.520 (2001).
81. 42 C.F.R. § 435.406 (2001).
82. 42 C.F.R. § 435.403 (2001).
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continuously to a medical institution for thirty days prior to
83
attaining Medicaid eligibility. In addition, the applicant must be
84
financially eligible (poor enough). In general, the applicant’s
85
income cannot exceed 300% of the current SSI benefit amount,
and resources must not exceed those applicable to SSI applicants.
The SSI rules divide resources (or assets) into two categories:
86
countable and excluded.
Excluded assets are the home,
household goods, a car, a burial plot and irrevocable prepaid burial
87
contract, a nominal life insurance policy, and very little else.
Countable assets—essentially, whatever is left—must be “spent
down” to Medicaid’s resource limit ($2000 in most states). The
applicant may instead give away his assets, voluntarily
impoverishing himself, in the hopes of attaining Medicaid
eligibility. Doing this without counsel is like walking through a
minefield blindfolded.
Any transfer of assets by a Medicaid applicant (or his spouse)
invokes the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, which places limits on
voluntary impoverishment for the purpose of becoming Medicaid
88
eligible. Section 1396p(c)(1) requires that states impose periods
of ineligibility for asset transfers made either without consideration
or for less than fair market value during a pre-application time
89
called the “look back period.” The look back period is thirty-six
months, or sixty months in the case of transfers to or from certain
90
trusts.
Interestingly, not every transfer for less than fair market value
will result in the imposition of a period of Medicaid ineligibility.
Congress has created numerous exceptions to the transfer penalty
rules. No penalty is applied with respect to transfers of any

83. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V) (1994).
84. See TIMOTHY L. TAKACS, ELDER LAW PRACTICE IN TENNESSEE § 5-5(a) (1998).
85. 42 C.F.R. § 435.1005 (2001). Typically, persons who qualify for SSI are
also eligible for Medicaid. Some states, called “209(b) States,” use more restrictive
criteria than those applicable to current SSI applicants. To further the objective
of brevity, see PERKINS & SOMERS, supra note 79, at 3.6 for a discussion of the 209(b)
rules.
86. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201 (2001) (countable resources) with 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1210 (2001) (excluded resources).
87. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1210.
88. See CENTERS FOR M EDICARE AND M EDICAID SERVICES, TRANSFERS OF ASSETS, at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/obs8.htm (last visited July 20, 2002).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1) (1994).
90. Id. Section 1396p(d) discusses how trusts are to be treated under the Act,
particularly with respect to the transfer of asset provisions in subsection (c).
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91

resource:
• To a spouse, or to a third party for the sole benefit of the
92
spouse;
• From a spouse to a third party for the sole benefit of the
93
spouse;
• To a blind or permanently and totally disabled child, or to a
94
trust established solely for the benefit of such child; or
• To a trust established solely for the benefit of a disabled
95
person under the age of sixty-five (65).
Nor is there a penalty when the principal residence is
transferred to:
96
• The individual’s spouse;
• A child under the age of twenty-one (21);
• A child who is blind;
97
• A child who is permanently and totally disabled;
• A sibling who has an equity interest in the residence and who
resided in the home for at least a year prior to the applicant’s
98
institutionalization; or
• A child who resided in the home for at least two years prior
to the applicant’s institutionalization and who provided care to
the individual, thereby permitting the individual to remain at
99
home instead of going to a nursing home.
Transfers do not trigger a period of ineligibility where the
100
transfer is for a purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid, or
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2) (1994).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) (1994); see Pacente v. Jindal, 751 So.2d
343, 344-46 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (stating transfer of an annuity by the annuitant to
his wife, but if she dies to his son “for as long as the Annuitant lives” held to be a
transfer “for the sole benefit of the spouse.”) 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i)
(1994).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(iii) (1994).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(iv) (1994).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1994).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(iv) (1994); see Scinto v. Rowe, No. CV
930308973, 1995 WL 31091, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1995). Here,
although he had provided primary care to his mother, the son failed to prove that
the care avoided institutionalization for two years. Id. at *2.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(i) (1994); see Pentuik v. Florida Dept. of
Health & Rehabilitative Serv., 584 So.2d 1098, 1098-1101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
In this case, the Medicaid applicant transferred assets the day before undergoing
surgery because he believed the operation would kill him. This was determined
not a transfer in order to qualify for Medicaid. Id. at 1101. Because, ipso facto,
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where the applicant intended to exchange the asset for fair market
101
value. Nor is a period of ineligibility imposed where the trans102
ferred assets are returned, or where imposition of a penalty
103
would cause undue hardship.
So, for example, an individual may transfer all of his countable
assets to his disabled child without penalty. Note that the disabled
child does not have to demonstrate a need for the assets: that is,
Medicaid does not require an asset test of the disabled child to
104
make the transfer non-disqualifying.
An individual who owns a $500,000 home may qualify for
Medicaid provided he meets all other criteria for eligibility. The
theory is that when the Medicaid recipient’s health improves, he
should have a home to return to; he should not have to sell it to
pay for his nursing home care. This benefit is largely illusory,
however. Because Medicaid limits the assets and income that the
Medicaid recipient may retain, there are seldom enough assets or
income available to keep up the house—that is, pay property taxes,
insurance, utilities, and the like. As a result, the burden of keeping
up the house usually falls upon the Medicaid recipient’s family.
Furthermore, upon the death of Medicaid recipients age fifty-five
or older, states are required to seek recovery of Medicaid payments
from the individual’s estate for nursing facility services, home and
community-based services, and related hospital and prescription
drug services. States have the option of recovering payments for all
105
other Medicaid services provided to these individuals.
This is
106
called “estate recovery.”
Courts and commentators have discussed the purpose of estate
recovery statutes. The California Supreme Court has observed that
estate recovery programs serve the purpose of permitting a state to
assist those in need, while easing the financial burden of doing so
by recouping benefits from a recipient’s estate, thereby preventing
heirs of the recipient “from unfairly benefiting from the

exempt assets are not counted, a transfer of an exempt asset other than the principal residence is not disqualifying. Id. at 1100.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(ii) (1994).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(iii) (1994).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(D) (1994).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (1994).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (1994).
106. See CENTERS FOR M EDICARE AND M EDICAID SERVICES, ESTATE RECOVERY
PROVISION, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/obs1.htm (last visited July 20,
2002).
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107

program.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has characterized the
Medicaid estate recovery program as a means “whereby money paid
to qualified individuals for health care purposes may be recovered
108
and reused to help other similarly situated persons.”
A
commentator has noted that “[t]he foremost consideration behind
estate recovery is the reduction of the overall cost of Medicaid to
109
states by recouping some portion of Medicaid expenditures.”
The practice is not without its critics. U.S. Senator Russell
Feingold, D-Wis., has described estate recovery as the real death tax
because it effectively imposes a 100% estate tax on the country’s
110
most vulnerable citizens. Some states object to estate recovery.
Texas, Michigan, and Georgia have informed federal officials of
their intention not to participate in estate recovery efforts,
111
apparently without repercussion.
Trying a similar gambit has
failed the state of West Virginia, at least to date. The Governor,
Attorney General, and a Congressman publicly oppose estate
recovery but have been told that unless the state continues its estate
recovery program, the federal government would withhold
Medicaid funds for long-term care services. West Virginia’s
opposition to Medicaid estate recovery was featured on the front
page of USA Today. According to USA Today, “A year after 85-yearold Aunt Rose died, [her niece] got a letter from a collection
agency saying her aunt’s estate owed Medicaid $51,000.” Aunt
Rose bequeathed her home, which apparently was all she had left,
to her niece. Now Medicaid is trying to take the house unless the
112
niece comes up with the money.
West Virginia argued
unsuccessfully to a federal district court that Congress
107. Kizer v. Hanna, 767 P.2d 679, 681 (Cal. 1989).
108. In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 1986).
109. Jon M. Zieger, The State Giveth and the State Taketh Away: In Pursuit of a
Practical Approach to Medicaid Estate Recovery, 5 ELDER L.J. 359, 374 (1997).
110. Sen. Feingold proposed a Medicaid amendment on May 21, 2001, which
would have eliminated estate recovery. 147 CONG. REC. S5406 (daily ed. May 22,
2001). The amendment was defeated on a procedural challenge. 147 CONG. REC.
S5229 (daily ed. May 21, 2001).
111. ELDERLAWANSWERS.COM, W. VA. LOSES LATEST ROUND IN EFFORT TO BLOCK
ESTATE
RECOVERY,
http://www.elderlawanswers.com/news/XcNewsPlus.asp?
cmd=view&articleid=162 (citing Laura Parker, West Virginia Fights Law that Makes
Heirs Sell Homes to Pay Off Medicaid Bill, USA TODAY, May 1, 2002, at 1A,
http://www.usatoday.com/usatonline/20020501/4073417s.htm) (last visited May
28, 2002).
112. See Laura Parker, Medicaid Patient Dies: Who Gets the House?, USA TODAY,
May 1, 2002, at 1A, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/01/usatcovmedicaid.htm.
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unconstitutionally coerces the states to implement estate recovery
113
programs as a condition to receiving federal Medicaid funds.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against West Virginia on
114
May 7, 2002.
A. What is Medicaid Planning?
Effective Medicaid planning guides the applicant through the
minefield of potential ineligibility. The effective Medicaid planner
helps an applicant preserve assets, while fitting within the financial
criteria for Medicaid eligibility. A typical Medicaid plan calls for
the applicant to transfer assets to other persons, thereby artificially
“impoverishing” the applicant. He is then “needy” enough to
qualify for Medicaid. Medicaid planning also helps applicants plan
around estate recovery issues. As a consequence, the cost of the
115
Medicaid recipient’s long-term care is shifted to the state.
Often, too, Medicaid planning is an explicit attempt to shift
from a private pay package of health care benefits to a “MedicaidPlus” benefits package. Theoretically, “individuals cannot purchase
116
a supplement to Medicaid.”
This is true, in part, because
Medicaid recipients (who do not plan) cannot qualify for program
benefits until they have exhausted their personal resources. It is
also true because providers are proscribed from charging
117
additional fees for covered services. However, effective Medicaid
planning can result in the creation of a pool of protected assets
that a family member uses to pay for goods and services that
Medicaid does not pay for, such as dental care or sitters, thereby

113. W. Va. ex rel. McGraw v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Serv.,
132 F. Supp. 2d 437, 437 (S.D. W.Va. 2001).
114. W. Va. ex rel. McGraw v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Serv.,
289 F.3d 281, 281 (4th Cir. 2002).
115. Ultimately, whether government (taxpayers) should fund health care is a
policy decision that remains controversial. LIAM M URPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE
M YTH OF OWNERSHIP 5 (2002). It is apparent, given the cost, that no individual
consumer can fund the cost of America’s public health infrastructure, which must
be maintained “at the ready” to be effective. Further complicating matters, the
public health infrastructure must be maintained to meet potential but unknown
future demands for services. One can argue (and we do), that under these
circumstances, the cost of the public health infrastructure is an appropriate
subject for “government intervention.” Id. at 6.
116. GRUBER, supra note 60, at 28. Even in non-Medicaid contexts,
supplements remain controversial because they may allow certain users of health
care services to jump to the front of the line. CUTLER, supra note 32, at 70-71.
117. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(3) (2001).
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improving the Medicaid recipient’s health and enhancing his
118
quality of life.
B. Objections to Medicaid Planning
Medicaid planning is legal. It is not uncontroversial, however.
A number of objections have been posed to Medicaid planning.
Seemingly, these objections stem from divergent views concerning
whether some higher moral rule, beyond the law, should guide
119
citizens who participate in the health care market system.
Assuming America retains a free-market health care system (as
opposed to moving toward universal health care), these criticisms
are largely irrelevant to the extent they urge elders to refrain from
self-interested conduct, while other market players, such as health
care providers and insurers, remain free to condition health care
access on payment (and profit).
Common Objection 1. Medicaid is for “the poor,” not for
those who voluntarily impoverish themselves to qualify for benefits.
Transferring assets to qualify for benefits is against public policy as
demonstrated by repeated acts of Congress to put a stop to it. In
1982, Congress enacted additional penalties for transferring assets
and, for the first time, authorized states to impose Medicaid
ineligibility periods and initiate estate recovery efforts. In 1985,
Congress restricted the use of certain types of trusts, such as the
“Medicaid Qualifying Trust.” In 1988, Congress added to the
length of the penalty period and eliminated exceptions to the asset
transfer rules (although at the same time adding protections for
the spouses of nursing home residents). In 1993, Congress further
tightened up the asset transfer rules and made estate recovery
mandatory. In 1996 Congress made transferring assets in order to

118. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(3)(i) (2001).
119. Compare Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory, with Jules L. Coleman & Brian
Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
233-60 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996). Natural law theorists hold that a higher law
exists against which society’s law can be judged, while legal positivists generally
hold that the law is fundamentally a social fact and that no connection exists
between it and morality. Bix, supra, at 223. The other philosophic camp many
American scholars fall into is legal realism, which examines, not the law as a
principle, but what judges actually do with the law. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in
A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261-79 (Dennis Patterson
ed., 1996). Given the natural inclination virtually all persons have toward
protecting their assets, our approach could be labeled “positive realism” given our
discussion of MRPC. See MRPC, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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qualify for Medicaid a crime; in 1997, this was changed to make
120
advising persons to transfer assets a crime.
Common Objection 2. Medicaid’s eligibility criteria were put
in place to ensure that only the truly needy obtain benefits. They
were not put in place to enable the taxpayers to subsidize
121
inheritances for the Medicaid recipient’s children.
Common Objection 3. If left unchecked, Medicaid planning
122
will bankrupt the program. Low Medicaid reimbursement rates
to nursing homes contribute to the understaffing and other
problems nursing homes face in delivering quality care to their
residents. The result will be a two-tier system of long-term care:
one for wealthy people who pay privately in private-pay-only
facilities, and the other for poor people in substandard, Medicaidonly nursing homes.
Common Objection 4. Children who engage in Medicaid
planning for their parents are depriving them of good care. If
indeed this assumption is true -- beneficiaries of Medicaid nursing
home benefits receive poorer care than those who pay privately -120. Popularly known as “Granny’s Lawyer Goes to Jail,” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7b(a)(6) provides:
Whoever for a fee knowingly and willfully counsels or assists an
individual to dispose of assets (including by any transfer in trust) in
order for the individual to become eligible for medical assistance
under a State plan under subchapter XIX of this chapter, if disposing
of the assets results in the imposition of a period of ineligibility for
such assistance under section 1396(p)(c) of this title, shall . . . be guilty
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(6) (1997). In 1998 the United States was enjoined from
enforcing this statute, which, while technically still on the books, makes such
counseling illegal. The provision was declared to be an unconstitutional limitation
on free speech. N.Y. Bar Ass’n v. Janet Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710, 710 (N.D.N.Y.
1998). In a March 11, 1998 letter, Attorney General Janet Reno informed the
Speaker of the House and the Vice President of the United States that the Justice
Department would not enforce the statute because “the counseling prohibition . . .
is plainly unconstitutional under the First Amendment . . . .” Letter from Janet
Reno, U.S. Attorney General, to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives (Mar. 11, 1998), http://www.seniorlaw.com/reno.htm.
121. “Allowing states to recover from the estates of persons who previously
received assistance furthers the broad purpose of providing for the medical care of
the needy; the greater amount recovered by the state allows the state to have more
funds to provide future services.” Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917, 925 (Ct.
App. 1995).
122. “The Medicaid program would be at fiscal risk if individuals were
permitted to preserve assets for their heirs while receiving Medicaid benefits from
the state.” Forsyth v. Rowe, 629 A.2d 379, 385 (Conn. 1993).
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under this view a child’s effort to accelerate Medicaid eligibility for
a helpless parent who does not know any better would be immoral.
Common Objection 5. Medicaid planning (that is, transfer of
assets) engaged in by children with their parents’ money is the
123
moral equivalent of elder financial abuse. In some instances, the
elderly person is exploited by relatives, who would rather see the
family fortune in their pockets than utilized for the elder’s nursing
home care. The elder is often unaware of the planning and
transferring of assets or is not informed fully of the impact of being
on public benefits.
Common Objection 6. In a health care system of limited
resources, Medicaid planning will lead to a deprivation of health
care from the truly needy, those who are really poor, not those who
have artificially impoverished themselves in order to qualify for
Medicaid. Medicaid planning may be legal, but it is against public
124
policy.
Common Objection 7. Medicaid planning discourages people
from purchasing long-term care insurance or saving to pay their
125
own long-term care costs.
Common Objection 8. Those who can pay privately have a
civic duty to do so, even if they could legally shift the cost to the
Medicaid program, so as to preserve Medicaid benefits for those
who are in genuine need.
Many elder law attorneys are sensitive about the public image
associated with Medicaid planning. Medicaid planners are often

123. See Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000) (noting that courts must retain discretion to respond to abuse).
124. See Allen v. Wessman, 542 N.W.2d 748, 753 (N.D. 1996) (“Public policy
will not allow the social safety net for persons who are old, poor, and unfortunate
to be exploited by those who are affluent.”); Meyer v. S.D. Dep’t. of Soc. Services,
581 N.W.2d 151, 156-58 (S.D. 1998); see also Johnson v. Guhl, 166 F. Supp. 2d 42,
51 (D.N.J. 2001) (“HCFA’s position does not frustrate Congress’ intent in enacting
the MCCA to enable the community spouse to live above the poverty level.
Instead, it ensures that Medicaid, as it was intended, helps the truly needy and
furthers the legislature’s intent to ‘require couples to bear a reasonable amount of
the costs of institutionalized care and thus preserve Medicaid resources.’”).
125. Impoverishment of applicants under the current system will encourage
future Medicaid applicants to purchase long-term care insurance. See JOSHUA M.
WIENER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATE COST CONTAINMENT INITIATIVES
FOR
LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE CRS-21 (2000),
http://newfederalism.urban.org/pdf/ltcare-initiatives.pdf; see also GRUBER, supra
note 60 (analyzing the economic decision-making process for consumers);
CUTLER, supra note 32, at 75 (“[People] might drop their private insurance
coverage if they are eligible for the public program.”).
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accused of “gaming the system” for their undeserving and
overprivileged clients.
Unfortunately, members of the Medicaid planning bar have
sometimes been their own worst enemies. For example, at the May
1996 Symposium of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys,
two prominent NAELA members (one a former President of the
organization) gave a presentation on Medicaid planning. Using
the format of a skit in which other NAELA members played the
roles of the family, the presenters took the audience through a
session in which an elderly couple, whose net worth exceeded
$750,000, was counseled on how to arrange their affairs to attain
Medicaid eligibility. Among the assets in the couple’s portfolio was
a vacation home. The skit became fodder for critics of Medicaid
eligibility planning and indeed was widely criticized by other
NAELA members.
We do not address each of these objections in detail. All
objections are trumped by our conclusion that the ethical
implications these objections raise are irrelevant as long as
Medicaid planning is practiced in an amoral health care market, in
which the only ethics that count are those of the marketplace.
C. Identifying the Stakeholders
Many stakeholders in the long-term care arena have an interest
in Medicaid planning. They include: (1) the Medicaid applicant
or recipient; (2) the applicant’s healthy spouse, still living in the
community; (3) the applicant’s heirs; (4) the government, which
funds the Medicaid program; (5) health care providers; and (6) the
insurance industry.
1. The Applicant’s Interests
Surveys show that the general population, which includes the
pool of potential Medicaid applicants, has a strong aversion to
126
nursing home care.
One study, which surveyed seriously ill
persons over age seventy, found that twenty-nine percent would
127
rather die than go to a nursing home. Improving quality of life
in nursing homes therefore should be viewed as imperative. Where
relocation to a long-term care facility is required, older persons
126. Robert L. Kane & Rosalie A. Kane, What Older People Want from Long-Term
Care, and How They Can Get It, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 114-115.
127. Id. at 115.
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value kindness, caring, compatibility and responsiveness. They
value private accommodations, as well as control and choice on
aspects of their daily lives. Good care furnished in the most
129
appropriate setting is a nonnegotiable necessity.
But how do they get it? “Long-term care” includes a broad
range of expensive health and social services. Choice in settings in
which long-term care is delivered is a luxury reserved for the
wealthy, however, as long as health care remains a commodity
rather than a right. After the United States Supreme Court’s
130
Olmstead decision, home health care options are expanding;
nonetheless, the Medicaid program remains focused on nursing
131
home care as the long-term care option of choice. Preserving
choice for the middle class, to the extent possible, is one interest
served through effective Medicaid planning.
Likewise, nursing home residents are concerned about
retaining enough assets once they leave the nursing home and
132
return home.
In The Changing Profile of Nursing Home Residents:
1985-1997, researchers found that nursing home residents are
returning home in increasing numbers. In 1985, 18% of residents
were discharged from nursing homes back into the community. By
1997, data showed that thirty percent of residents were discharged
128. Id. at 116.
129. Id.
130. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The Olmstead
decision interpreted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its
implementing regulation, requiring States to administer their services, programs,
and activities “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities.” Id. at 592. The federal government has embarked on
a major initiative to facilitate states’ efforts to comply with the ADA and the
Olmstead decision. See CENTERS FOR M EDICARE AND M EDICAID SERVICES, AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT/OLMSTEAD DECISION, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/olmstead/
(last modified May 10, 2002).
131. NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 5. “Despite some recent
improvements, long-term care continues to pose major challenges: People who
need long-term care often do not get the care they need or prefer, and families’
caregiving and financial burdens are often heavy.” Feder, supra note 44, at 41. In
many states, neither Medicare nor Medicaid will pay for assisted-care living
services, or the eligibility criteria is so strict that as a practical matter public
benefits are unavailable to residents of any long-term care facility other than a
nursing home. Medicare-funded home health is generally limited to persons who
are “confined to the home.” 42 C.F.R. § 409.42(a) (2001); STEIN & CHIPLIN, supra
note 45, § 4.02[A].
132. “Persons who are discharged alive after depleting most of their life’s
savings may not be able to be financially independent in the community and may
subsequently become eligible for Medicaid or other forms of public assistance
(e.g. SSI or food stamps).” ALECXIH & KENNELL, supra note 10, at 8.
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133

because they had recuperated or stabilized. There is, however,
little value in returning home if medical costs, including Medicaid
“spend down,” have rendered independent living economically
impossible. Preserving assets is necessary to enable the individual
to return home.
134
Presumably, everyone has a right to continue living.
The
prevailing view, however, is that health care resources are limited
135
and, therefore, must be rationed. When health care necessary to
136
sustain life is rationed (withheld), the effect is passive euthanasia.
In a market economy, care is rarely withheld from those with
means; most commentators agree that ability to pay is a primary
137
function of access to health care services.
For those who are unable to pay, and the State has promised to
provide them health care services,
the demands quickly exceed the ability of the State to
133. NADINE R. SAHYOUN, ET AL., THE CHANGING PROFILE OF NURSING HOME
RESIDENTS: 1985-1997 3 (2001), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/agintrends/
04nursin.pdf. From October 1998 to September 1999, 834,000 residents were
discharged (thirty-three percent of all discharges during that period) after
recovery or stabilization. See U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, The
National Nursing Home Survey: 1999 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 4 (2002),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_13/sr13_152.pdf. This should come as
no surprise. The stated purpose of nursing home care is to attain and maintain
the highest practicable level of physical, mental and psycho-social well-being
possible. 42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2001); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-108(a)(5) (2001)
(stating a goal is to return residents home or to a less restrictive environment).
134. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (J.W. Gough ed.,
Basil Blackwell 3d ed. 1966) (1690). One author explores a different viewpoint in
John Hardwig, Is There a Duty to Die, 27 HASTINGS CTR REP., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 34.
He states “[w]e fear death too much. Our fear of death has lead to a massive
assault on it. We still crave after virtually any life-prolonging technology that we
might conceivably be able to produce. We still too often feel morally impelled to
prolong life – virtually any form of life – as long as possible. As if the best death is
the one that can be put off longest.” Id. at 40.
135. See Levy, supra note 23, at 116. “Rationing may be defined as the de facto
or de jure allotment or limitation of medical care necessitated by a shortage of
money available.” Gregory N. Rutecki, Rationing Medical Care to the Elderly Revisited:
Futility as a Just Criterion, 7 J. BIBLICAL ETHICS IN M ED ., Summer 1993,
http://www.bmei.org/jbem/volume7/num3/ruteki.htm. See generally, TIMOTHY L.
TAKACS, HEALTH CARE RATIONING: CHALLENGES FOR THE ELDER LAW ATTORNEY, at
http://www.tn-elderlaw.com/rationing.html (October 1996).
136. “Allowing to die – sometimes called ‘passive euthanasia’ – is already
accepted as a humane and proper course of action in certain cases.” SINGER, supra
note 17, at 209. For a discussion involving the difference between active and
passive euthanasia, see id. at 202-13. The author notes that in traditional Eskimo
communities, it was custom for a man to kill his elderly parents. Id. at 217.
Obviously, the affected elder may wish to have a voice in this decision.
137. See e.g., BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 21.
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supply these services. When demands exceed the supply,
what do [policymakers do]? They limit services in subtle
ways, such as by (1) requiring more “documentation,” (2)
limiting the number of hospital beds, (3) demanding
early discharge, (4) reducing payment for services and
procedures, (5) requiring more out-patient procedures,
(6) limiting the number of visits, (7) requiring
“justification” before payment, (8) establishing stricter
“Certificate of Need” requirements, (9) increasing taxes,
(10) accusing the suppliers of services of waste, fraud and
abuse, etc. The list is unending but there is never a hint
that the system is fatally flawed and that the system has
never worked
as promised in any country in which it has
138
been tried.
So as Medicaid’s fiscal crisis deepens, and one response to
ameliorating the crisis is to limit services, the elderly have a
substantial interest in preserving private funds that can be used to
fund health care “reclassified” by public benefits programs and
139
insurance entities as “futile” or “not medically necessary.” The
Medicaid safety net does not pay for those “quality of life” items
that may make life in a nursing home a little more bearable.
Medicaid recipients who want decent clothes, dentures, snacks,
entertainment, books and magazines, and furnishings for their
140
rooms have to pay for these things themselves. For most, that is
hardly possible out of the $2000 Medicaid resource limitation and
the Personal Needs Allowance that they can retain out of their
monthly income (the remainder of which is paid to the nursing
home, under Medicaid’s share-of-cost requirement).
138. William H. Tucker, Social Security—Good Concept, Bad Execution, 160
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL M ED . 2680 (2000).
139. See WESLEY J. SMITH, FUTILE CARE THEORY AND M EDICAL FASCISM: THE DUTY
TO DIE, at http://www.frontpagemag.com/archives/miscellaneous/futile.htm
(Apr. 9, 2002); CENTER FOR BIOETHICS, UNIVERSITY OF M INNESOTA, DISTRIBUTING
LIMITED HEALTH CARE RESOURCES 2 (1997) (discussing that “health care resources
are scarce relative to needs” and failure to place limits on delivery of health care
services would limit other national priorities), http://www.bioethics.umn.edu/
publications/Limited_Resources.pdf. Futile treatment is treatment that secures
biologic survival, but not meaningful recovery or reversal of the condition being
treated. Rutecki, supra note 135.
140. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(c)(8)(ii) (2001). “Nursing home residents also value
control and choice on aspects of the daily lives, particularly with reference to
leaving the facility from time to time and telephone and other communication
with those outside the facility. . . . The majority [of nursing home residents] place
a high value on privacy.” Kane & Kane, supra note 126, at 116. Medicaid does not
fund these “luxuries.” See also BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 161.
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Although a resident’s means should not determine the quality
of services received, it may. In July 2000 CMS released phase 1 of
its report, Appropriateness of Minimum Nurse Staffing Ratios In Nursing
Homes, which details substandard care in American nursing homes
141
and pins the blame primarily on understaffing.
Persons with
means can afford to supplement services that nursing homes
provide, in some instances, transforming substandard care to
acceptable care. In other cases, preserved assets may provide
residents and family members with the means to create a form of
private quality enforcement; assets may pay for sitters, who can
serve as private ombudsmen to ensure that essential services are
142
provided.
In almost every case, when death occurs, the Medicaid
applicant will want to pass wealth to his heirs, an impulse as old as
143
the Bible itself. Former President Jimmy Carter says the following
about his own estate plan:
One of the most interesting and gratifying responsibilities
at our age is to decide what to do with accumulated wealth
and possessions. In all too many cases, couples fail to
leave a will of any kind. Whether it’s a few pieces of
furniture and some personal items or broader holdings of
stocks and real estate, we should decide what will happen
to our belongings. We must remember that, no matter
what we do, the Internal Revenue Service will be one of
our major heirs. How much of our estate will go for taxes
can be greatly affected by whether or not we plan for the
future. . . .We are leaving a substantial portion of our
estate to the Carter Center. . . .We have retained an
interest in some of our bequests, amending the
arrangements to accommodate changing circumstances
and sometimes for sentimental reasons. For instance, we
have a special feeling about our property around Plains.
141. Phase I of the Report, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/
reports/rp700hmp.asp (July 2000); Phase II, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
medicaid/reports/rp1201home.asp (March 2002); see also M INORITY STAFF, SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ABUSE OF NURSING HOME RESIDENTS IS A M AJOR PROBLEM IN U.S.
NURSING HOMES (2001), http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs/pdf_inves/
pdf_nursing_abuse_rep.pdf.
142. This can be particularly important in areas where local Ombudsmen, for
whatever reason, are indifferent to substandard care.
143. The concept of inheritance is ancient. Without detailing the breadth of
the Hebrew notion of “birth-right,” suffice it to say that the notion of passing one’s
substance to the next generation is also ancient. See Genesis 27:27.
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Both Rosalynn’s and my ancestors who were born in the
1700s are buried there, and most of the land that we own
was acquired several generations ago. . . .[W]e wish
to
144
keep intact and owned by our direct descendants.
Former President Carter’s description of his estate plan
underscores the natural inclination we all have toward directing
how our assets will be distributed (which runs counter to the
145
position espoused by critics of Medicaid planning).
Beyond
personal and sentimental reasons for controlling the disposition of
assets, the social significance of inheritance laws was recognized by
Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America. Those who control
the direction wealth takes as it passes to the next generation have
146
immense power.
Tocqueville observed: “What is called family
pride is often founded upon an illusion of self-love. A man wishes
to perpetuate and immortalize himself, as it were, in his great147
grandchildren.”
For middle-class seniors who need long-term
care, the present Medicaid system is, in effect, a health lottery that
148
deprives them of this opportunity.
No rational person would
149
enter such a lottery voluntarily.
2. The Applicant’s Healthy Spouse
Failure to plan can impoverish the Medicaid applicant’s
healthy spouse. A Medicaid applicant is not eligible to receive
144. CARTER, supra note 20, at 129-30; see also In re Labis, 714 A.2d 335 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (authorizing Medicaid planning transfer in substituted
judgment/guardianship context because ward would have wanted to provide for
his wife for life and benefit his children thereafter).
145. Indeed, since the natural response of virtually everyone is self
preservation, one can legitimately question the moral justification, to the extent
they urge some “higher law,” of the position taken by Medicaid planning critics.
146. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 50-51 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1966) (1835).
147. Id. at 49.
148. The social effect of injecting income into poor families is beyond the
scope of this article. However, low income is related to poor material conditions.
See Michael Marmot, The Influence of Income on Health: Views of an Epidemiologist, 21
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 31, 32. Marmot speculates that a threshold
exists below which material conditions such as clean water, good sanitation,
adequate nutrition, adequate housing and warmth are not accessible. Above the
threshold, although there are still differing opportunities for social participation,
the differences in material conditions no longer have a plausible connection with
pathology. For additional information on the status of poor families, see POLICY
ANALYSIS FOR CALIFORNIA EDUCATION, NEW LIVES FOR POOR FAMILIES?, at
http://pace.berkeley.edu/pace_new_release.html (2002).
149. See Levy, supra note 23, at 114-15.
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150

Medicaid if his countable resources exceed $2,000. Those assets,
however, may have been necessary to support his spouse during her
retirement. In 1988, Congress enacted the Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act (MCCA) “to protect the elderly and disabled
population from the financial disaster caused by catastrophic
health care expenditures not currently reimbursed under the
151
Medicare and Medicaid programs.”
Included in MCCA was a
special section that pertains to Medicaid and the treatment of
152
resources and income for spouses. Under prior law, nearly all of
a couple’s assets had to be depleted before a spouse
institutionalized in a nursing home (the “institutionalized spouse”)
could become eligible for Medicaid, often resulting in the
impoverishment of the spouse remaining at home (the
“community spouse”). The purpose of MCCA “is to end this
pauperization by assuring that the community spouse has a
sufficient—but not excessive—amount of income and resources
available to her while her spouse is in a nursing home at Medicaid
153
expense.”
To meet the Congressionally-mandated goal of avoiding
impoverishment of the community spouse, MCCA provides special
allowances of assets and income for married couples where one
spouse resides in a nursing home.
At the time of
institutionalization, a “snapshot” of the couple’s resources is
154
taken.
The couple’s resources are separated into one of two
categories, countable and exempt, and a total value of the couple’s
countable resources is determined. Countable assets include
checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit, money
market funds, stocks and bonds, and other similar assets, whether
155
held by them separately or jointly.
Of the countable assets, the community spouse is permitted to
retain what is termed the “community spouse resource
156
allowance.” Assets that are exempt, such as the couple’s home,
are not considered when the community spouse resource allowance
is set. Of the total countable resources, the community spouse
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1994).
151. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105, pt. 2, at 65-68 (1998), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N 803, 888.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (1994).
153. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105, supra note 151, at 888.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(1)(A) (1994).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c) (1994).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(2) (1994).
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resource allowance is the greatest of (1) $17,856 (in 2002, adjusted
annually); (2) the lesser of one-half of the total countable resources
or $89,280 (in 2002, adjusted annually); (3) an amount established
pursuant to a fair hearing; or (4) an amount transferred under
157
court order. All other countable resources above this amount are
158
attributed to the institutionalized spouse. When the countable
resources attributed to the institutionalized spouse have been
appropriately reduced to the Medicaid resource limitation ($2,000
in most states), the institutionalized spouse is eligible for Medicaid
nursing home benefits.
Once eligibility for Medicaid is established, a determination is
made of the allocation of income to the community spouse. MCCA
provides that a community spouse is entitled to a minimum
monthly maintenance needs allowance (“MMMNA”) to be set by
159
the states at 50% above the poverty level for a family of two. Posteligibility, the income allowance may be deducted from the
institutionalized spouse’s income that would otherwise be paid to
the nursing home.

157. Id. It is worth noting that the elderly often live on accumulated assets
because income declines when they leave the workforce. See ALECXIH & KENNELL,
supra note 10, at 6. If this is true, one can argue that the CSRA is woefully
inadequate. The 2002 HHS Poverty Guidelines set the poverty level for single
persons residing in the forty-eight contiguous States at $8,860. U.S DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 2002 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES, at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/02poverty.htm (last updated Apr. 24, 2002). The
life expectancy for females attaining age 65 is 19.2 years; for males it is 16.3 years.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, FAST STATS A TO Z, at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm (last updated June 13, 2002). At
age 65, a community spouse who retains the maximum CSRA to pay her living
expenses at the 2002 poverty level will outlive her money by more than nine years.
If she requires assisted living (which is not covered by either Medicare or
Medicaid), the average cost of care is $2,159 per month, or $25,908 per year.
M ETLIFE, GENERAL NEWS: 2002 AND 2001 PRESS RELEASES, ASSISTED LIVING AVERAGES
$2,159 PER M ONTH IN U.S. METLIFE M ATURE M ARKET INSTITUTE STUDY FINDS, at
http://www.metlife.com/Applications/Corporate/WPS/CDA/PageGenerator/0,1
674,P250%257ES356,00.html (May 29, 2002). Even with the maximum CSRA, the
community spouse will not have sufficient assets to fund assisted living care for
four years at current rates. If she requires nursing home care herself, she will have
insufficient assets to pay for two years of care in virtually all states and, in some
areas, would have insufficient assets to fund a single year of care. By way of
contrast, the CSRA is slightly over one-half the average annual income of
physicians for one year. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TRENDS AND
INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE M ARKETPLACE, 2002, at 77 (2002),
http://www.kff.org/content/2002/3161/marketplace2002_finalc.pdf.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(3)(A)(i), (B)(iii) (1994).
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Medicaid planning, therefore, takes on special urgency, where
a principal goal of the planning is to preserve assets for the benefit
of the community spouse. Arguably, then, any planning within the
ambit of the rules that results in protecting assets and income for
the community spouse ought to be largely free from controversy.
In fact, however, it is not.
Medicaid planners, seeking to provide community spouses
with maximum protection, are sometimes accused of exploiting
160
loopholes in the law.
Excess countable resources that would
otherwise be at risk for the cost of the institutionalized spouse’s
nursing home care may be spent without limit on exempt resources
for the community spouse. One strategy might be for the
community spouse to purchase a new home–regardless of value.
The community spouse could purchase a $500,000 home to qualify
her husband for Medicaid, and then sell or transfer the home posteligibility, without affecting his continued eligibility.
Another popular strategy is to purchase an immediate,
161
irrevocable annuity for the benefit of the community spouse.
The financial services industry has caught on to this one, and a
cottage industry of selling “Medicaid friendly” annuities has
162
arisen.
The practice has become so widespread and so
apparently abusive that courts in New Jersey, Ohio, and
163
Pennsylvania have severely restricted the strategy, and at least one
state (Alabama) known to the authors bans their use altogether as a
strategy to qualify the institutionalized spouse for Medicaid. Rules
that would limit or prohibit annuities are under consideration
164
elsewhere.
A strategy that is popular in New York, but seldom used

160. See In re Labis, 714 A.2d 335 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
161. Thomas D. Begley, Jr., and Jo-Anne Herina Jeffreys, The Use of Annuities in
Medicaid
Planning:
An
Update,
ELDERLAW
REPORT
2001,
at
http://www.njelderlaw.com/library/article_display.asp?ID=43 (last visited July 20,
2002).
162. For
an
example,
see
“Medicaid
Friendly”
annuity,
at
http://www.standardagents.com/product.asp?mid=261 (last visited July 20, 2002).
163. Johnson v. Guhl, 166 F. Supp. 2d 42, 58 (D.N.J. 2000); McNamara v. Ohio
Dep’t. of Human Servs., 744 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Bird v. Pa.
Dep’t. of Pub. Welfare, 731 A.2d 660, 669 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
164. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE SERVICES AGENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE FISCAL IMPACT
STATEMENT
(2001)
(discussing
Indiana
Proposed
Rule
01-175),
http://www.in.gov/legislative/pdf/01175.pdf; see also Sylvia Hsieh, States Crack
Down on Medicaid Planning, LAW. WKLY., July 9, 2001, http://www.lkrlaw.com/
medicaid-planning.htm.
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elsewhere, is called “spousal refusal.” Under MCCA, Medicaid
benefits may not be withheld from the institutionalized spouse
should the community spouse refuse to make countable resources
available to him. Instead, Medicaid has a right to sue the
165
community spouse for support, under a theory of subrogation.
This results in a predictable pas de deux between the community
spouse and the State Medicaid agency (at least as practiced in New
York). Once institutionalization occurs, the community spouse in
New York refuses to make the couple’s resources available to pay
for her husband’s nursing home care; Medicaid pays and bills the
community spouse at the Medicaid rate, which is usually
considerably lower than the facility’s private pay rate. Married
couples without the benefit of counsel pay the private rate, unless
they know how spousal refusal works.
3. The Applicant’s Heirs
The interests of the applicant’s heirs are relevant only to the
166
extent they support those of the elder. About eighty-five percent
of elders who need long-term care receive it from family and
167
friends. Today, “an estimated one [in] four U.S. households is
168
involved in caring for a loved one aged fifty or older,” over
169
twenty-two million caregiver households nationwide. “[Seven]
170
million Americans are caring for a parent at any given time.”
The average caregiver age is forty-six, and more than seven of ten
171
caregivers are female.
While the average caregiver provides
approximately eighteen hours of care each week, one in five
172
provides forty or more hours of care each week.

165. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(3) (1994).
166. M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 4, R. 1.2(d) (2002). We
omit from this article a discussion of conflicts of interest that typically arise in an
elder law practice. For a practical discussion of such conflicts, see any treatise on
elder law.
167. BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 158.
168. FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, FACT SHEET: WORK AND ELDERCARE, at
http://www.caregiver.org/factsheets/work_eldercareC.html.
169. NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AARP, FAMILY CAREGIVING IN THE U.
S.: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 8 (1997), http://caregiving.org/
content.reports.finalreport.pdf.
170. FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, supra note 168.
171. NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 169, at 8.
172. Id. at 17.
See also AARP, CAREGIVING & LONG-TERM CARE, at
http://www.research.aarp.org/health/fs82_caregiving.html (December 2000).
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173

Caregiving is now “viewed as an unpaid extension of the
public health system, providing [approximately] $196 billion” in
174
uncompensated care annually.
It should therefore be
encouraged and supported. While running for President, thenGov. George W. Bush stated:
A growing number of Americans are making the choice to
care for loved ones at home. And many families have
found that this enriches their lives together--connecting
the generations . . .and making grandparents a daily
encouragement to grandchildren, and a regular presence
in the teaching of values. We will give extra help
to those
175
who care for elderly family members at home.
The question then is what can be done to support caregivers?
Financial assistance would help. Unpaid caregiving is not
“free.” Over the course of a caregiving career, caregivers can lose
as much as $650,000 in wages, Social Security benefits, and
176
pensions.
The cost to employers is estimated at $1,142 in lost
productivity per year per employee; the Alzheimer’s Association
estimates that Alzheimer’s disease alone will cost American business
177
$61 billion in 2002. While it may be impossible to replace lost
caregiver wages dollar-for-dollar, government could at least
partially recompense the caregiver by recognizing an exception to
173. Caregiving is defined as
providing unpaid care to a relative or friend who is aged fifty or older
to help them take care of themselves. Caregiving may include help
with personal needs or household chores. It might be taking care of a
person’s finances, arranging for outside services, or visiting regularly to
see how they are doing. This person need not live with you.
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 169, at 6.
174. NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, TOWARD A NATIONAL CAREGIVING
AGENDA:
EMPOWERING
FAMILY
CAREGIVERS
IN
AMERICA
2
(2001),
http://www.caregiving.org/content/reports%5ccaregiver%20summit-1241.pdf.
175. GEORGE W. BUSH FACT SHEET, IMPROVING LONG-TERM CARE FOR SENIOR
AMERICANS
(quoting
then-Governor
George
W.
Bush),
at
http://www.taxplanet.com/library/bush510/bush510.html (May 10, 2000).
176. THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 174, at 4.
177. FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, supra note 168. The disease will cost
corporate America $36.5 billion in 2002 for workers who take off time to care for
Alzheimer’s patients. That figure includes loss of productivity ($18 billion),
absenteeism ($10 billion), and hiring temporary workers ($2 billion), among
other costs. Health care business costs and research will require an additional
$24.6 billion, according to the study. This annual cost is nearly twice as much as
was estimated in 1998, says the Alzheimer’s Association.
ROSS KOPPEL,
ALZHEIMER’ S ASSOCIATION, ALZHEIMER’ S DISEASE: THE COST TO U.S. BUSINESSES IN
2002, at 2-5 (2002),
http://www.alz.org/media/newsreleases/current/
062602ADCosts.pdf.
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the estate recovery rules for the benefit of an unpaid caregiver, in
much the same way that states may not recover when there is a
surviving spouse or a disabled child. Effective Medicaid planning
offers a private solution.
4. The Government
On January 23, 2002, Dan L. Crippen of the Congressional
Budget Office testified before the House Budget Committee.
Long-term budget pressure is looming just over the horizon, said
Crippen.
Those pressures result from the aging of the U.S.
population (large numbers of baby boomers will start
becoming eligible for Social Security retirement benefits
in 2008 and for Medicare in 2011), from increased life
spans, and from rising costs for federal health care
programs. According to midrange estimates, if current
policies continue, spending on Social Security, Medicare
and Medicaid combined
will nearly double by 2030, to
178
almost 15% of GDP.
Federal and state governments have yet to shoulder the
responsibility of delivering, as opposed to financing, health care. As
Feder and her colleagues put it, “Medicare and Medicaid policy
resembles a fiscal tug-of-war, rather than a concerted effort to
179
address people’s needs.” In 2030, 70 million Americans will be
65 years of age or older. Of that number, 8.5 million will have
180
attained age 85.
Experts forecast as many as three million
181
nursing home residents in 2030, an increase from 1,720,500 in
182
2000. Who is going to take care of the disabled elderly, and at
178. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2003-2012: Before the House
Comm. on the Budget, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Director,
Congressional Budget Office), http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=32
76&sequence=0.
179. Feder, supra note 44, at 48.
180. SAHYOUN, supra note 133, at 7.
181. Id. A fact statement produced by candidate George W. Bush, Improving
Long-Term Care for Senior Americans, May 10, 2000, paints a more dire picture.
Candidate Bush estimated that “between 2000 and 2030, the nursing home
population will rise from 2.8 million to 5.3 million; total nursing home
expenditures will rise from $69 million to $330 million.” GEORGE W. BUSH FACT
SHEET, supra note 175. The Bush estimate does not appear to differentiate
between nursing home residents over 65 years of age, and those under that age.
182. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QT-P12. GROUP Q UARTERS POPULATION BY SEX ,
AGE , AND TYPE OF GROUP Q UARTERS: 2000 (2000), http://factfinder.census.gov/
servlet/QTTable?ds_name=D&qr_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_QTP12&_lang=en&g
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what cost?
One possible solution to government’s long-term care
183
financing crisis is to cap prices.
Another is to internalize the
delivery of care. A third is to drastically tighten the criteria for
Medicaid eligibility, forcing nursing home residents to apply more
of their private resources to pay for their own care, including
reliance on unpaid caregivers. The State of Connecticut, for
example, has requested a “Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration
Waiver” that, if granted by CMS, would allow Connecticut to
impose a period of Medicaid ineligibility for transfer of assets not
from the date of the transfer but from the date that the individual
would otherwise qualify for Medicaid nursing home benefits (that
is, at the time of application when the applicant is a nursing home
184
resident).
The avowed purpose of the waiver proposal is to
frustrate those individuals who have the foresight to plan for
Medicaid eligibility and force them instead to purchase long-term
care insurance.
Assuming the U.S. health care system continues to function as
a market, government could do more than it is presently doing. It
could actively participate in the development of a national health
care agenda (otherwise known as “goals”), and regulate both
supply and demand to move market participants toward a more
185
universal health care system. Still, government is not a panacea.
Governments and markets, according to some experts, work handeo_id=01000US&_caller=bfri&_ts=45670541133.
183. See U.S. v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming a Medicaid
fraud conviction, thus illustrating government’s ultimate power to control prices).
184. “Through this proposed Demonstration project, the behavioral changes
of applicants would be evaluated with the expectation that the revised TOA
[Transfer of Asset] policy would encourage personal responsibility and the use of
LTC insurance, while also realizing substantial savings to the Medicaid program.”
For more information about the Connecticut waiver proposal, see the state’s
Department of Social Services Web site. STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, TRANSFER OF ASSETS SECTION 1115 & DEMONSTRATION WAIVER
PROPOSAL 2 (2002),
http://www.dss.state.ct.us/pubs/TOA_proposal.pdf.
Whether transferring assets adversely affects Medicaid financial stability and
integrity has not gone unquestioned, however. Joshua Wiener, for one, who is
widely acknowledged as an expert in the area of long-term care financing, wrote in
1998 that while almost all states regard transferring assets as a problem, only a few
states have elevated it to a major policy concern affecting Medicaid’s fiscal health.
Joshua M. Wiener and David G. Stevenson, State Policy on Long-Term Care for the
Elderly,
17
HEALTH
AFFAIRS,
May-June
1998,
at
81,
97,
http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/haffairs/wiener.pdf.
185. Thomas Rice et al., Reconsidering the Role of Competition in Health Care
Markets: Introduction, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’ Y & L. 863, 867 (2000).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

37

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 2
TAKACS MCG UFFEY FORMATTED2. DOC

148

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

9/6/2002 10:07 PM

[Vol. 29:1

in-hand and need each other. Government needs markets to help
ensure that the services produced are the ones that are wanted and
resources are not unnecessarily squandered. Markets need
government to ensure that prices are fair, all segments of the
population are served, and that objective information is
186
disseminated. Determining the proper blend is the key.
5. Health Care Providers
Providers of health care—doctors, hospitals, and nursing
homes—are in business. Health care in fact is a big business,
consuming 13.2% of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product in
187
2000.
Even a non-profit hospital must have a stable stream of
revenue in order to keep the doors open. This profit-making, or
revenue-enhancing, objective, founded on the profit motive, puts
facilities at odds with elders who need health care and may or may
not have sufficient resources to pay for it. Should they be entitled
to it nonetheless, regardless of ability to pay?
In 1971, Dr. Robert M. Sade expressed the view that medical
care is not a right. His argument, premised in free market
economic theory, is that “the concept of medical care as the
patient’s right is immoral because it denies the most fundamental
of all rights, that of a man to his own life and the freedom of action
188
to support it.” Medical care is a service provided by doctors and
others to people who wish to purchase it. According to Sade, now a
cardiothoracic surgeon and director of the Institute of Human
Values in Health Care at the Medical University of South Carolina,
any contrary position would wrongly deprive doctors of the fruit of
189
their labor. Although Sade argues that his views mirror Locke’s,
Sade misapprehends Locke. It is true, as Locke said, that the labor
of one’s body is his own. No one compelled Sade to enter the
healing profession, however. Sade’s choice dictates that he must
live with government’s regulation of that profession, whatever form
that may take. Sade’s (unstated) view that medicine is a business
rather than a profession is at the heart of concerns relating to the
186. Id. at 869.
187. Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending Projections for 2001-2011: The Latest
Outlook, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 207.
188. See Robert Sade, Medical Care as a Right: A Refutation, in ETHICS IN
M EDICINE 573-580 (Stanley Joel Reiser et al. eds., MIT Press 1977) (1971), available
at http://www.aapsonline.org/brochures/sademcr.htm.
189. See LOCKE, supra note 134.
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current Medicaid system. During the 1990s, as Medicaid (and
other health care financing vehicles) moved from a fee-for-service
system to a capitated payment system, the potential for profit due
to increased personal labor evaporated. Instead, profit is now
maximized through cost-savings, one method of which is by a
reduction in services. This “less is more” approach will not reverse
itself until professionalism, rather than profit, is paramount.
On June 14, 1999, the American Academy of Family Physicians
190
issued a press release endorsing universal “coverage.”
This
proposal, while positive, appears to be premised on continuation of
the insurance financing model presently in place. On December 4,
2001, the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association
adopted a “Declaration of Professional Responsibility: Medicine’s
191
Social Contract with Humanity.” The AMA has committed itself
to “advocate for social, economic, educational and political
changes that ameliorate suffering and contribute to human well192
being.” Nonetheless, a difference of opinion exists concerning
what this entails.
6. Insurers
193

In theory, long-term care should be insurable. “In fact, the
need for long-term care is far from a necessary concomitant to
194
aging.” People in all age groups face a risk they will need longterm care, although the risk of requiring long-term care does
195
increase with age.
Should this risk be spread through public
(social) or private insurance, or through a publicly-financed, health
196
care delivery system? The answer depends in part on who should
190. See Press Release, American Academy of Family Physicians, All Americans
Must Have Health Insurance: A Joint Statement (June 14, 1999),
http://www.aafp.org/news/990614nr.html. The Statement was joined by the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Emergency Physicians,
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American College of
Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine, the American College of
Surgeons, and the American Medical Association.
191. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mm/369/decofprofessional.pdf.
192. Id. Art. VIII.
193. NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 2.
194. Judith Feder, Long-Term Care: A Public Responsibility, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS,
Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 112.
195. Id.
196. Douglas Clement, Beyond Supply and Demand, FEDGAZETTE (May 2002)
(“The only guaranteed means of dealing with adverse selection is compelling
everyone to purchase insurance and insisting that everyone pays their share. But
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pay for it, and how much they should pay. The sick want expansive
insurance, while the healthy do not (until they get sick).
Mandatory insurance, essentially a tax, forces the healthy to
197
subsidize health care for the unhealthy.
The insurance industry, which is profit motivated, insists it can
meet this need. It has developed long-term care insurance
products to enable an individual, for a premium, to transfer the
risk of the high cost of nursing home care to an insurance
company. Medicaid and Medicaid planning pose a risk to the
insurance industry, however. If potential policy purchasers can
secure social insurance (i.e. Medicaid) for less than the cost of
private insurance, they have no incentive to purchase long-term
198
care insurance.
In fact, one of the policy issues now under debate is whether
Medicaid and long-term care insurance can coexist. Encouraging
people to purchase private long-term care insurance while working
to strengthen the public safety net for those who cannot afford it
probably are incompatible strategies, according to a 1999 study
sponsored by The Commonwealth Fund.
The Bush
administration’s policy of promoting the purchase of long-term
care insurance by giving purchasers tax breaks would erode
support for efforts to assure access to care for the poor through
199
Medicaid or another system, the study’s author contends.
Nonetheless, the federal government projects continued
reliance on an insurance model as the means of providing access to
health care services. The assumption underlying this policy is
such ‘universal’ insurance requires government intervention—the opposite of free
markets — and substantial income redistribution. Aside from the political
obstacles to such a policy, universal health insurance incurs the economic
inefficiencies of taxation, transfers and administrative costs—deadweight losses
that
economists
abhor.”),
http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/0205/supply.cfm. All insurance contains a subsidy used to finance health care. The
subsidy in private insurance is a transfer of resources from the healthy to the poor.
Social insurance includes the former, but typically adds a transfer from the wealthy
to the poor as well. BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 15.
197. BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 13, 163. Others argue,
however, that no redistributive effect is realized so long as value is returned to
taxpayers (or policy purchasers). See Levinson, supra note 33, at 553.
198. See CUTLER, supra note 32, at 75. See also CENTER FOR LONG-TERM CARE
FINANCING, THE LTC TRIATHLON: LONG-TERM CARE’ S RACE FOR SURVIVAL (2000),
http://www.centerltc.org/pubs/triathlon.pdf.
199. See M ARK M ERLIS, FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ROLES, at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/
elders/merlis_longtermcare21st_343.asp (Sept. 1999).
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flawed, however.
Fundamentally risk-adverse, insurers are
motivated to cover those persons who are low-risk health service
200
users, not to provide universal access. If insurance is intended to
serve as the point of access to long-term care, therefore, government must diligently oversee and set the ground rules by which
201
insurance companies go about their business. For example, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) prohibits the use of preexisting condition clauses to
exclude workers who change jobs. HIPAA does not regulate
marketing, so insurers simply exclude those deemed undesirable
202
risks through pricing and selling tactics.
VII. BACK TO ETHICS
Elder law attorneys are uniquely positioned to counsel elders
regarding this complex area of the law. If they fail or refuse to
counsel elders regarding legally permitted options, elder law
attorneys will have derogated their duty to their clients. From this
narrow perspective—call it the legalistic perspective—a lawyer’s
failure to advise his client of all of his long-term care financing
options is unethical. That is the lawyer’s duty under the rules of
203
professional conduct. Moreover, by failing to counsel elders who
seek advice about how to qualify for benefits under the Medicaid
program, the legal profession would tacitly concede that America’s
legal system, indeed its political system, no longer has room for,
and no longer condones, divergent values.
But that still does not answer our question: in a broader sense,
is it ethical for the lawyer to advise the client to engage in Medicaid
planning? Conversely, why might it be unethical to advise a client
who wishes to engage in Medicaid planning? Needless to say, the
lawyer cannot advise the client to do something that would result in
harm to the client—not, in any event, without the client’s consent.
Under this standard, there may be an ethical duty on the lawyer to
advise his client of the potentially adverse consequences to the
client that may flow from Medicaid planning (such as harm to the
Medicaid program, limits on access to nursing home care, and the

200.
866.
201.
202.
203.

See generally, CUTLER, supra note 32, at 5; see also Rice, supra note 185, at
See Stone, supra note 31, at 955.
Id. at 956.
M ODEL RULES OF PROF’ L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 2.1 (2002).
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204

like).
But what about harm that the client could not realistically
expect to happen to him personally, but harm that may result to
others, such as those we will call the “truly poor”—that is, those
who are Medicaid eligible without planning? An elder who has
money has options: he can plan for Medicaid eligibility, but if he
needs care that Medicaid cannot or will not pay for, he can arrange
his affairs so that resources may be legally unavailable to him, for
Medicaid purposes, but nonetheless informally available to him
(such as by transferring assets to a trusted relative who will hold the
money for him in case he needs it). The truly poor do not have
that option.
Does the lawyer have a duty not to harm the truly poor, a duty
that derives from the duty to his client, as we discussed earlier?
Whether they are rich or poor, elders are participants in an
amoral health care market. Medicaid (like its companion,
Medicare) is not a health care delivery system. It is a health care
205
financing system that addresses interests in the market place. For
an elder who is “lucky” enough to develop an acute illness, such as
myocardial infarction or a stroke, Medicare will pay the bill. For
persons who are unlucky and develop a chronic illness such as
Alzheimer’s disease that requires years of costly long-term care, the
American health care market place forces them to “spend down” to
Medicaid eligibility. This acute/chronic dichotomy can be
explained only as an artifact of the American long-term care
financing system, as opposed to a long-term care delivery system.
No one intends to get sick. No moral opprobrium should therefore
attach to efforts by the sufferer and his family to engage in
Medicaid planning to minimize the financial impact chronic illness
206
imposes on them.
Participants in a free market, including elders who need longterm care, are under no obligation to pay more than the going rate
204. See ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at 433 (comparing the MRPC with the Rules of
Model Conduct, and quoting from EC 7-8). “It is often desirable to point out
those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally
permissible.” Id. Of course, this returns us to the question, “Is there a higher
law?”
205. It cannot be a coincidence that until the name was changed in 2001, the
federal agency that oversees Medicare and Medicaid was called the Health Care
Financing Administration.
206. Morality must be doable. M AYO, supra note 8, at 59-60. Of course, one
may still consider the effect of moral hazard and take appropriate measures to
limit overuse of medical services.
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for any commodity. In the desert, the person who controls the
water supply is under no obligation to sell at any price. The price is
therefore set by fiat rather than through negotiation. Health care
can be similarly viewed. The sick and frail are frequently in no
207
position to bargain for a better deal. To suggest that purchasers
of health care services should pay more than the minimum net cost
to secure those services, merely because they have the resources to
do so, is as absurd as criticizing wealthy persons for shopping at the
discount store, whose lower prices are driving other merchants out
208
of business. Where the market permits planning which results in
a reduced net price, a purchaser cannot be faulted for availing
209
himself of the lower price even if he could pay more. In a health
care system in which the commodity known as health is bought and
sold, there is no reason why any market participant should value
another person’s property (that is, health) more than his own.
Until the United States elevates health care to a moral right,
instead of a property right, Medicaid planning is morally and
ethically justified.

207.
This information asymmetry [resulting from the consumer’s lack of
knowledge concerning the complexities of medical care diagnosis or
treatment] gives physicians market power. Physicians recommend to
people what services are appropriate and often provide those services
after they are recommended. Physicians also have leeway in pricing, at
a time when consumers have little ability to price shop. Unless
physicians have objective functions looking out for patient welfare,
inefficient outcomes will result.
CUTLER, supra note 32, at 26.
208. If patients are relegated to a competitive market, then what is good for
the goose must also be good for the gander. “An increasingly competitive health
insurance market is likely to treat people less as patients and more as consumers
who must protect themselves from error and exploitation.” Wendy K. Mariner,
Patients Must Have Rights, NAT’ L L. J., Feb. 19, 2001, at A21, available at
www.patient-rights.org/publications/pdfpublications/NLJpatie.pdf. Patients must
be allowed to protect themselves.
209. Indeed, self-interest is often viewed as fostering market efficiency because,
in theory, each market participant responds appropriately to prices for the
purpose of maximizing profit. Jeremy Waldron, Private Property, in A COMPANION
TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 3, 13 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
Although it is tempting to do so, we cannot lose sight of the fact that even
impoverished American elders seldom confront absolute poverty. See SINGER, supra
note 17, at 218-22 (defining absolute poverty). Does that mean Medicaid planning
is unimportant? Quite the contrary. With many elders, “it’s not just his money at
stake, but his pride and self-worth.” M ORRIS, supra note 10, at 244.
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VIII. REFORM PROPOSALS
Before meaningful reform can take place, the federal and state
governments must decide which objectives and stakeholder
interests merit priority. If health care should be viewed as a right,
reform proposals should be universal. If health care is not a right,
reform may be unnecessary; markets exist to meet the long-term
care needs of consumers. Even if reform did include universal
health care, should the middle class status of the elderly be
protected, or should elders who are struck with chronic disease be
required to impoverish themselves before they receive assistance?
Any long-term care reform proposal must address the major
issue of moral hazard: whether social insurance creates a sufficient
210
incentive (or disincentive) to pay for one’s own health care.
Health security may or may not be a right for all citizens—that is
certainly a debatable proposition—but no one contends that the
community owes malingerers a free ride. Any reforms must
include sufficient checks and balances to ensure that each recipient
of health security has an incentive to carry his portion of society’s
211
cumulative burden.
A solution put forward in 1998 by the Center for Long-Term
212
Care Financing is called “LTC Choice.”
The authors of this
report deal with the “moral hazard” problem posed by the current
system of long-term care financing (that is, Medicaid), namely that
the system punishes those persons who are frugal and rewards
those who are profligate, by eliminating Medicaid’s “loopholes”
and requiring individuals who attain age sixty-five either to present
proof of financial responsibility or to register their assets and
income with the government.
The tough choice is whether or not they will insure
privately or rely on the LTC Choice program. If they insure
privately, or earmark sufficient assets permanently for
210. “The principal of justice is linked to . . . fairness.” BODENHEIMER &
GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 217 (discussing distributive justice). Even if it is
inappropriate to define access in terms of dollars held by the person needing care,
arguably there is nothing unfair about linking access to labor, at least for persons
who are not disabled.
211. One of the basic tensions in the delivery of health care services is between
caring for the individual and caring for the community at-large. BODENHEIMER &
GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 292.
212. See STEPHEN A. MOSES & DAVID M. ROSENFELD, LTC CHOICE: A SIMPLE,
COST-FREE SOLUTION TO THE LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING PUZZLE 27-30, at
http://www.centerltc.com/pubs/CLTC.F.R.eport.pdf (Sept. 1, 1998).
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long-term care, their problem is solved. If they choose to
rely on the government-backed LTC Choice program, they
must report annually on their income and assets in order
to secure their estates as collateral and to eliminate the
problem of artificial self-impoverishment
which has
213
plagued the Medicaid program.
No one who could afford to purchase insurance would elect to
make his assets and income available to the government instead.
That of course seems to be the goal of the Center’s proposal—to
stimulate demand for private long-term care insurance.
Another solution, put forward by the National Academy of
Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA), is to federalize social insurance for
214
long-term care. Specifically, the NAELA White Paper proposes
the creation of Medicare Part D, which would transfer
responsibility for most long-term care financing from the states to
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Medicare Part D
would be financed through payroll deductions and would provide
each beneficiary with a pool of money to be used for any form of
215
long-term care. NAELA proposes that the pool be $200,000 in
2000, indexed to inflation. There would be a $10,000 deductible,
216
after which Medicare would pay 80% of the cost of care.
Eligibility would be decided in a manner similar to Social Security
disability determinations, with coverage triggered at the loss of two
217
activities of daily living. Eligibility would be presumed, with the
218
government having the burden of proof if benefits are denied.
Both proposals are coercive, as any proposal must be to
guarantee coverage and access to care. LTC Choice relies on the
private market place to provide coverage and benefits and on the
government to deny benefits to those who are profligate; but it
retains Medicaid as a safety net for persons who are able to prove
they are indigent through no fault of their own. The NAELA
proposal relies on the social insurance model. Individuals are
forced to participate in the risk pool through the tax system and
213. Id. at 29.
214. NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 6. The NAELA proposal is similar
to the system Germany implemented in 1994. See Alison Evans Cuellar & Joshua M.
Wiener, Can Social Insurance for Long-Term Care Work?: The Experience in Germany, 19
HEALTH AFFAIRS, May-June 2000, at 8. Germany’s experience is described as a
success. Id. at 22.
215. See NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 21-22.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 22.
218. Id. at 25.
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payroll deduction.
As Mark Merlis points out, LTC Choice is not only “draconian”
but impracticable. “By the time people need long-term care, there
is no way to determine why some people have resources and others
219
do not.”
Someone must make the decision on whether the
applicant for Medicaid has been profligate during his lifetime or
suffered a bad break and is deserving of public benefits. Who
wants to step up to the plate and tell Grandma she is not deserving
of help?
Moreover, both proposals suffer from the same defect: each is
a long-term care financing system, rather than a long-term care
delivery system. What happens to the elder who exhausts his
insurance benefits or lifetime pool of money? Will he be
guaranteed access to care nonetheless?
Although it is a demand-side proposal, two features in
particular make the NAELA proposal attractive: (i) it retains
autonomy, a value critical to many consumers, who would retain
the right to choose the setting in which long-term care will be
delivered; and (ii) it increases the bargaining power of long-term
care purchasers through utilization of a national risk pool. By
contrast, a system of private insurance has the potential of leaving
the purchasing system disconnected in a manner that allows health
care providers to dictate prices, unless the federal government
tightly regulates the long-term care insurance industry. Where, as
demographics make clear, demand for long-term care exceeds the
system’s current supply, cost management (if done at all) must take
place on the supply side. A strong purchaser can impose a pricing
220
structure on health care providers.
We believe members of society who are beyond what society
marks as retirement age should be provided necessary health care
without attaching any litmus test to its provision. At least, that
should be the case with respect to today’s elders who could not

219. M ERLIS, supra note 199.
220. Among other notable proposals is that put forward by Physicians for a
National Health Program in 1991. See A National Long-Term Care Program for the
United States: A Caring Vision, 266 J. AM. MED . ASS’ N 3023 (1991), reprinted in PNHP,
http://www.pnhp.org/publications/JAMA12_4_91.htm (last visited June 22,
2002). To compare how other Western nations, including Great Britain, the
Netherlands, Spain, and Germany, finance long-term care costs, see generally 324
BRIT. MED . J. (June 29, 2002), discussing within various articles how certain
Western nations finance long-term care, http://bmj.com/content/vol324/
issue7353.
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have anticipated the devastating cost of long-term care. What
about tomorrow’s elders? They have time to plan and contribute
toward their own care. Society cannot allow them to consume their
resources and then expect social assistance when need arises. To
do so, ultimately, would allow health care recipients to consume
their own labor and the labor of other persons. No society can
afford to cover unlimited health care needs for very long without
insisting upon contribution. An approach such as that advanced by
NAELA would require everyone to contribute a portion of his or
her labor to the risk pool.
IX. CONCLUSION
As we stated when we began, we do not expect to resolve all
ethical questions relating to how long-term care is delivered in the
United States. In this article, perhaps we ask as many questions as
we answer. Controversies surrounding how to finance and deliver
health care (and other social programs, such as Supplemental
Security Income, public housing, and food stamps) will continue to
abound so long as some persons have access to essential lifesustaining goods and services and others do not. Furthermore,
even if the government provides universal health care, controversy
will continue as stakeholders debate who should be covered and
221
the scope of coverage. Medical care presents one of “the most
(melo)dramatic examples of the problems” associated with any
222
program that, potentially, has a redistributive effect.
Nonetheless, our primary goal as elder law attorneys should be
to improve the lives of our clients. Having explicitly acknowledged
that this is our goal, we would do well to consider the future. As
the NAELA White Paper says, “[t]he current system in our country
for addressing long-term care is a non-system, a hodgepodge of
services that fails to meet the needs of the elderly and disabled in
the variety of long-term care settings. It is economically inefficient
223
and it fails to assure the quality of services which are provided.”
Even if controversy continues to surround questions of coverage
and scope, a case can be made that moving America’s health care
system toward a universal right is a moral imperative of the elder
law attorney.
221.
222.
223.

Levinson, supra note 33, at 560.
Id.
NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 5.
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Until we attain that goal, although it is controversial and
legitimately subject to criticism, Medicaid planning is ethical and
defensible. Despite what our critics say about us, elder law
attorneys do acknowledge a place for differing ethical views.
Where one stands on a particular issue usually depends on where
one sits, however. Yes, stakeholders do have differing interests,
which cause each participant in the health care market to approach
the Medicaid program and Medicaid planning differently. These
differing interests do not invalidate the wishes of clients who
choose to engage in legally permissible asset protection strategies.
And these differences do not make Medicaid planning “unethical,”
but they do force clients and their lawyers to recognize that their
acts have consequences for the American long-term care system.
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